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Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power
John Yoo∗
Along with George Washington and Abraham Lincoln,
Franklin D. Roosevelt is considered by most scholars to be one of
our nation’s greatest presidents. FDR confronted challenges
simultaneously that his predecessors had faced individually.
Washington guided the nation’s founding when doubts arose as
to whether Americans could establish an effective government.
FDR radically re-engineered the government into the modern
administrative state when Americans doubted whether their
government could provide them with economic security. Lincoln
saved the country from the greatest threat to its national
security, leading it through a war that cost more American lives
than any other. FDR led a reluctant nation against perhaps its
most dangerous foreign foe—an alliance of fascist powers that
threatened to place Europe and Asia under totalitarian
dictatorships. To bring the nation through both crises, FDR drew
deeply upon the reservoir of executive power unlike any
president before or since—reflected in his unique status as the
only chief executive to break the two-term tradition.1

∗ Emanuel S. Heller Professor of Law; Visiting Scholar, American Enterprise
Institute. Thanks to Jeffrey Senning for outstanding research assistance.
1 There are a great number of works on Roosevelt, with more appearing all the
time. I have relied on general works for the background to this chapter. See generally
JOHN YOO & JULIAN KU, TAMING GLOBALIZATION: INTERNATIONAL LAW, THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION, AND THE NEW WORLD ORDER (2012); CONRAD BACK, FRANKLIN DELANO
ROOSEVELT: CHAMPION OF FREEDOM (2003); 1 JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT:
THE LION AND THE FOX 1882–1940 (1956); JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS, ROOSEVELT:
SOLDIER OF FREEDOM (1970); KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE BECKONING OF DESTINY 1882–
1928 (2004); FRANK FREIDEL, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: A RENDEZVOUS WITH DESTINY
(1991); GEORGE MCJIMSEY, THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT (2000); 1
ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE CRISIS OF THE OLD ORDER 1919–1933 (1957); ARTHUR
M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 1933–1935
(1958); 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE POLITICS OF
UPHEAVAL (1960); GEOFFREY C. WARD, A FIRST-CLASS TEMPERAMENT: THE EMERGENCE
OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT (1989). Similarly, there are a multitude of works on the New
Deal. Some that have been particularly helpful are ALAN BRINKLEY, VOICES OF PROTEST:
HUEY LONG, FATHER COUGHLIN, & THE GREAT DEPRESSION (1983); ALAN BRINKLEY, THE
END OF REFORM: NEW DEAL LIBERALISM IN RECESSION AND WAR (1996); BARRY CUSHMAN,
RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION
(1998); DAVID M. KENNEDY, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION
AND WAR, 1929–1945 (1999); WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT
AND THE NEW DEAL 1932–1940 (1963); SIDNEY M. MILKIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE
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FDR came to office in the midst of the gravest challenges to
the nation since the Civil War. The most obvious and immediate
crisis was the Great Depression. FDR placed the president in the
role of a legislative leader and produced a dramatic restructuring
of the national government, even though the Depression, as a
breakdown of the domestic (and global) economy, fell within the
constitutional authority of Congress. Large Democratic majorities
in Congress expanded federal regulation of the economy beyond
anything before seen in peacetime. Regulation of prices and
supply, product quality, wages and working conditions, the
securities markets, and pensions became commonplace where they
had once been rare. Social Security was not just one of the
New Deal’s most important planks, but an expression of the
whole platform.
The federal government would declare responsibility to
coordinate and regulate economic activity to provide stability. It
had always exercised broad economic powers during wartime, but
FDR made management of the economy by a bureaucracy of
experts a permanent feature of American life. While the
Republican presidents who had dominated elections since the
Civil War had left economic decisions to the market, FDR pushed
the federal government to provide for economic as well as
national security.
FDR’s revolution radically shifted the balance of power
among the three branches of government, as well as between the
nation and the states. Under the New Deal, Congress delegated
to the executive branch the discretion to make the many
decisions necessary to regulate the economy. Congress did not
have the time, organization, or expertise to make the minute
decisions required. The New Deal did not just produce a federal
government of broad power—it gave birth to a president whose
influence over domestic affairs would expand to match his role in
foreign affairs. When the Supreme Court stood in the way of the
new administrative state, FDR launched a campaign to increase
the membership of the Court to change the meaning of the
Constitution. When political parties challenged the New Deal,
FDR concentrated power in the executive branch, which
undermined their ability to channel benefits to their members.
The New Deal produced a presidency that was more
institutionally independent of Congress and more politically free
of the parties than ever before.2
PARTIES: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN PARTY SYSTEM SINCE THE NEW DEAL
(1993); and G. EDWARD WHITE, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE NEW DEAL (2000).
2 See, e.g., MILKIS, supra note 1, at 98–124; THEODORE J. LOWI, THE PERSONAL
PRESIDENT: POWER INVESTED, PROMISE UNFULFILLED (1985).
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The Great Depression spawned foreign threats, too.
Economic instability in Europe set the conditions for the rise of
fascism first in Italy, then in Germany and Japan. Roosevelt
realized early that American interests would be best served by
supporting the democracies against the Axis powers, but he was
confronted by a nation wary of another foreign war and a
Congress determined to impose strict neutrality. FDR used every
last inch of presidential power to bring the nation into the war on
the side of the Allies, including secretly coordinating military
activities with Britain, attempting to force an incident with
Germany in the North Atlantic, and pressuring Japan until it
lashed out in the Pacific. FDR’s steady leadership in the face of
stiff congressional resistance stands as one of the greatest
examples of presidential leadership in the last century, one that
redounded to the benefit of the United States and the free world.
This Article will review FDR’s approach to executive power
by examining three dimensions of his presidency: domestic
policy, foreign policy, and civil liberties in wartime. First, it will
examine FDR’s expansion of presidential power by leading
Congress, in the throes of the Great Depression, to create a vast
administrative state. He followed with a claim of presidential
independence in interpreting the Constitution, which he enforced
with a Court-packing plan that eventually forced the Justices to
agree. As the administrative state grew in leaps and bounds,
FDR expanded the power of the White House in a failing effort to
maintain centralized, rational control of the bureaucracy. Second,
it will examine FDR’s aggressive use of executive authority to
face the rise of Imperial Japan and Nazi Germany. FDR
stretched existing laws barring U.S. involvement in World War II
to the breaking point, and then went even further with claims of
sole executive power to assist the Allies. Third, this Article will
examine FDR’s attitude toward civil liberties in wartime by
focusing on three decisions: the use of military commissions to try
Nazi saboteurs, the internment of Japanese-American citizens,
and the widespread interception of electronic communications.
FDR had a vision of the office in keeping with his great
predecessors, Washington and Jefferson. He took full advantage
of the independence of the presidency and vigorously exercised
its constitutional authorities. In order to respond to crises, both
in peace and war, he contested the Constitution’s meaning with
the other branches of government. He challenged the Supreme
Court’s effort to stop the New Deal with his Court-packing plan.
To meet the rise of Germany and Japan, he relied on a robust
reading of the Commander-in-Chief power—even if it meant
ignoring the Neutrality Acts—to bring the United States into the
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war. FDR understood Berlin and Tokyo’s existential threat. He
would set the example for the Cold War presidents to follow in
both managing the vast regulatory state at home and meeting
the challenges of dire threats abroad.
I. THE NEW DEAL AND THE COURTS
FDR entered office in the midst of the worst economic
contraction in American history. Between the summer of 1929
and the spring of 1933, nominal gross national product dropped
by fifty percent.3 Prices for all goods fell by about a third; income
from agriculture collapsed from $6 billion to $2 billion; industrial
production declined by thirty-seven percent;4 and business
investment plummeted from $24 billion to $3 billion. About onequarter of the workforce, thirteen million Americans, remained
consistently unemployed, and the unemployment rate would
remain above fifteen percent for the rest of the decade.5 More
than 5000 banks failed, with a loss of $7 billion in deposits.6
From the time of the crash in October 1929 to its low in
July 1932, the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell more than
seventy-five percent.7 It was not a problem caused by famine or
drought, dwindling natural resources, or crippled production;
crops spoiled and livestock were destroyed because market prices
were too low.
Americans were losing faith in their political institutions to
solve the crisis. Though the causes of the Depression were
complex, some (FDR included) blamed “economic royalists,”
financiers and speculators, and the rich. Economists and
historians have argued ever since over the causes of the
Depression. Little evidence seems to support the claim that the
stock market crash triggered the Depression—stock markets
have sharply declined since then, most recently in 1987, with no
underlying change in economic growth.
3 See MILTON
THE UNITED STATES

FRIEDMAN & ANNA JACOBSON SCHWARTZ, A MONETARY HISTORY OF
1867–1960, at 299–301 (1963).

Id. at 301.
Id.
Id. at 317, 330.
7 To understand the economics of the Great Depression and the New Deal, see 1
ALLAN H. MELTZER, A HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE, 1913–1951 (2003); Peter
Temin, The Great Depression, in 3 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES 301 (Stanley Engerman & Robert Gallman, eds., 2000); THOMAS E. HALL & J.
DAVID FERGUSON, THE GREAT DEPRESSION: AN INTERNATIONAL DISASTER OF PERVERSE
ECONOMIC POLICIES (1998); RICHARD K. VEDDER & LOWELL E. GALLAWAY, OUT OF WORK:
UNEMPLOYMENT AND GOVERNMENT IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA (N.Y. Univ. Press
rev. ed. 1997); BARRY EICHENGREEN, GOLDEN FETTERS: THE GOLD STANDARD AND THE
GREAT DEPRESSION, 1919–1939 (1995); and FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 299–
301. JOHN KENNETH GALBRAITH, THE GREAT CRASH 1929 (2d ed. 1988), remains a classic
treatment, but one that has been surpassed by more recent work.
4
5
6

Do Not Delete

2018]

3/5/18 1:46 PM

Franklin Roosevelt and Presidential Power

209

In their classic Monetary History of the United States, Milton
Friedman and Anna Schwartz argued that a normal recession
deepened into the Great Depression because the Federal Reserve
mistakenly responded to the banking panic by restricting the
money supply.8 A deflation in prices followed, which led to a
steep drop in economic activity. Ben Bernanke, the current
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, elaborated on this theme by
arguing that the Fed’s deflationary banking policies tightened
the credit available to businesses and households, further
suppressing economic activity.9 Others argue that the Great
Depression must be understood within the context of the
international economy, which witnessed bank failures and
recession in Germany and France, defaults on World War I loan
and reparation payments, abandonment of the gold standard,
and the dumping of agricultural products on world markets.
While our understanding of the Great Depression has
improved thanks to the scholarship of the last forty years, a clear
consensus of its causes has yet to emerge. Unsurprisingly then,
to the Americans who lived through it, the collapse of the
economy was bewildering, confusing, and without precedent. The
Hoover administration’s policies did not help and might have
made matters even worse. As historians have realized, Hoover
did not adopt the aloof, hands-off attitude that his political
opponents charged. During his administration, Congress doubled
public works spending, and the federal budget deficit rose to $2.7
billion, at that time the largest in American peacetime history.
He pressed business executives to maintain employment and
wages, and experimented with policies, such as the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation’s emergency loans to businesses, which
would set important examples for the New Dealers.10
But Hoover’s initiatives were mere stopgaps that were
swamped by other policy mistakes. Though he had initially asked
for tariff reductions, Hoover signed the notorious Smoot-Hawley
Act, which raised rates and killed international trade flows.
Following the conventional economic wisdom of the day, Hoover
sought to balance the budget with tax increases at a time when
the economy needed fiscal stimulus. As Milton Friedman and
Allan Meltzer have separately argued, the Federal Reserve
pursued a deflationary strategy, cutting off the economy’s
oxygen, when increases in the money supply were called for.11
8
9
10
11

at 271.

FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 240–42.
BEN S. BERNANKE, ESSAYS ON THE GREAT DEPRESSION 51 (2000).
KENNEDY, supra note 1, at 164–65.
See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 299–301; MELTZER, supra note 7,
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Some of Hoover’s failure stems from his vision of the
presidency. As president, he refused to assume the role of
legislative leader, resisted the expansion of the federal agencies,
and opposed national welfare legislation—all on constitutional
grounds.12 FDR’s vision of the office could not have created a
sharper contrast. FDR led the nation through a frenzy of
experimentation in policies and government structure without
parallel in American history. There appeared to be no
comprehensive philosophy behind the New Deal, which comes as
little surprise, given the confusion that prevailed at the time over
the causes of the Depression.
Without any true understanding of the reasons for the
collapse, the New Dealers tried anything and everything.
Thinking that overproduction was the culprit, some
recommended the cartelization of industries to reduce supply and
increase prices. Others who blamed under-consumption
advocated public jobs programs and welfare relief. Some believed
that the budget deficit was the problem, and urged an increase in
taxes and cuts in spending. Some thought international trade
was a cause, and advocated both more flexibility in trade
negotiations and the dumping of excess agricultural production
overseas. Pragmatic and political (he had been a professional
politician for most of his life), and unsure about the true causes
of the Depression, Roosevelt flittered from idea to idea. Some had
the effect of canceling each other out—public works projects
sponsored by the National Recovery Administration had to buy
raw materials at prices inflated by controls imposed by the
Department of Agriculture.
Throughout all the experimentation and expansion of
government, the one thing that did not change was the focus on
the presidency. FDR became the father of the modern presidency
by moving the chief executive to the center of the American
political universe. FDR drafted the executive’s wartime powers
into peacetime service, but without calling for any formal change
in the Constitution. In his First Inaugural Address, he declared
that “our Constitution is so simple and practical that it is
possible always to meet extraordinary needs by changes in
emphasis and arrangement without loss of essential form.”13
What FDR wanted was access to the constitutional powers
granted to the president during time of emergency. He promised
12 Ellis W. Hawley, The Constitution of the Hoover and Franklin Roosevelt
Presidency During the Depression Era, 1930–1939, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 83, 90–91 (Martin Fausold & Alan Shank eds., 1991).
13 2 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 15 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1938).
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to seek from Congress “broad executive power to wage a war
against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given
me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”14 FDR’s expansion
of the powers of the presidency, both political and constitutional,
would grow from this basic theme—the economy and society
would henceforth be regulated in ways that were once considered
suitable only for war.
The nation got a taste of what FDR meant when, on his
second day in office, he issued the second emergency
proclamation in American history. During the period between
FDR’s election and his inauguration, a massive run on banks had
forced many to close their doors or stop lending. Invoking the
Trading with the Enemy Act,15 FDR imposed a national banking
holiday and prohibited all gold transactions.16 Roosevelt’s use of
the Act was questionable, to say the least. Congress had passed
the Act in 1917 to give the president broad economic powers
during wartime or national emergency, but not to regulate the
domestic economy in the absence of a foreign threat. Without the
statute, FDR was left to act under an unspecified presidential
emergency power. At the end of the banking moratorium,
Congress convened in special session and passed the Emergency
Banking Act, which gave the federal government powers to
control gold and currency transactions, to own stock in banks,
and to regulate the re-opening of the banks.17 Because the
Roosevelt administration had only finished drafting the
legislation the night before, a rolled-up newspaper substituted as
a prop for an actual copy of the bill’s text, and the House spent
only thirty minutes discussing the legislation.
Roosevelt set a precedent for his successors by rushing a
torrent of legislation through Congress in his first 100 days. The
National Industrial Recovery Act (“NRA”), the Agricultural
Adjustment Act (“AAA”), the Emergency Banking Act, the
Emergency Railroad Transportation Act (“ERTA”), and the Home
Owners Loan Act (“HOLA”) all granted FDR extraordinary
economic powers to fight the Depression. Their enactment
signaled the breakdown of the previously sharp distinction
between the executive and legislative branches. The executive
branch took the primary responsibility for drafting bills,
Congress passed them quickly with minimum deliberation
Id.
Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 50 U.S.C. §5 (2000).
Robert Jabaily, Bank Holiday of 1933, F EDERAL R ESERVE H ISTORY
(Nov. 22, 2013), https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/bank_holiday_of_1933
[http://perma.cc/PQN4-UDFU].
17 Emergency Banking Relief Act of 1933, Pub. L. 1, 48 Stat. 1.
14
15
16

Do Not Delete

212

3/5/18 1:46 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

(sometimes sight unseen), and the laws themselves delegated
broad authority to the president or the administrative agencies.18
Through the agencies, the executive branch would impose an
unprecedented level of centralized planning over the peacetime
economy. The AAA, for example, gave the executive the power to
dictate which crops were to be planted.19 Under the NRA,
agencies enacted industry-wide codes of conduct, usually drafted
by the industries themselves, to govern production and
employment.20 New Dealers sought to address falling prices for
commodities by setting higher prices, reducing competition, and
limiting production.21
Little attention was given to constitutional problems with
the legislation, which threatened to exceed the Supreme Court’s
limitations on federal power. Laws like the NRA or the AAA
pressed the Constitution’s grant of authority to Congress to make
laws “to regulate Commerce . . . among the several States.”22
Other laws, such as the new public employment and
unemployment relief programs, raised constitutional issues
about the national government’s taxing and spending authority,
but again these were only problems of federalism, not of
presidential power. They mirrored the steps that the national
government had taken to mobilize the economy for military
production while reducing domestic consumption—many of the
early programs of the New Deal were modeled on World War I
efforts. As William Leuchtenburg has observed, war became a
metaphor for the calamity brought on by the Depression, and
FDR and his advisers turned to their wartime experience for
solutions.23 “Almost every New Deal act or agency derived, to
some extent, from the experience of World War I.”24
FDR’s legislative whirlwind set in motion a series of events
that culminated in confrontation with the Supreme Court. Even
though
the
President
would
suffer
politically
and
constitutionally, he would eventually prevail. The roots of the
conflict stretched back to the Progressive Era, when the Justices
held that the Interstate Commerce Clause did not allow
regulation of manufacturing or agriculture within a state. Under
the theory of dual federalism, the Court blocked antitrust

HAWLEY, supra note 12, at 92.
Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933, 7 U.S.C. ch. 26, § 601 et seq.
HALL & FERGUSON, supra note 7, at 124.
21 Id. at 124–26.
22 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
23 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE FDR YEARS: ON ROOSEVELT AND HIS LEGACY
41–53 (1995).
24 Id. at 53.
18
19
20
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enforcement against a sugar-refining monopoly in 1895 because
the refining itself did not cross interstate lines.25 In 1918, it held
unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited the interstate
transportation of goods made with child labor.26 Even though the
federal ban applied only when the product moved across state
lines, the Court held that “the production of articles, intended for
interstate commerce, is a matter of local regulation.”27 When
Congress attacked child labor again with a ten percent excise tax,
the Court blocked that too, on the ground that Congress could not
use a tax to achieve a prohibited end.28
The Court matched its limits on federal authority to regulate
the economy with similar restrictions on the states. Where
Congress could only exercise the powers carefully enumerated in
Article I, states enjoyed a general “police power” over all conduct
within their borders. The courts, however, read the Fourteenth
Amendment—which forbids states from depriving individuals of
life, liberty, or property without due process29—to block a great
deal of state business regulation. In Lochner v. New York, the
Court struck down a state law that prohibited bakers from
working more than sixty hours a week or ten hours per day.30
According to the majority, the Constitution protected the bakers’
individual right to contract to work as much as they liked.31 The
state could not adopt economic legislation to redistribute income
within the industry (the law favored established bakeries at the
expense of immigrant bakers), or infringe the rights of free
labor.32 In dissent, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes famously
accused the majority of following its preferences rather than the
law.33 “[A] Constitution is not intended to embody a particular
economic theory, whether of paternalism . . . or of laissez faire,”
Holmes memorably wrote.34 “The Fourteenth Amendment does
not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.”35 From the time
of Lochner to the New Deal, the Court invalidated 184 state laws
governing working hours and wages, organized labor, commodity
prices, and entry into business.36

See United States v. E.C. Knight, 156 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1895).
See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 276 (1918).
27 Id. at 272, 276.
28 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 35–36, 43–44 (1922).
29 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
30 Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 64 (1905).
31 Id. at 64.
32 Id. at 62.
33 Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 271, 311 (1932) (striking
down a state legislative bar requiring a demonstration of necessity for licensing and
25
26
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Legislation enacted during FDR’s first 100 days in office
virtually dared the Justices to block the New Deal. The NRA did
not just attempt to ban a single product or manufacturing
process—it placed all industrial production in the nation under
federal regulation. The AAA did the same with agriculture, and
another law with coal mining. Laws passed later in FDR’s term,
such as the National Labor Relations Act and the Public Utility
Holding Company Act, set nationwide rules on unions and
utilities, while the Social Security Act created a universal system
of unemployment compensation and old age pension.37
FDR was following in the footsteps of presidents who dared
to interpret the Constitution at odds with the other branches.
FDR himself appeared to have held few constitutional doubts.
New Deal theorists believed, for example, that the Interstate
Commerce Clause pertained to almost all economic activity in the
nation because all goods manufactured or grown within a state
traveled through the channels of interstate commerce to reach
the market.38 While the federal government might usually defer
to the states on many matters, the Depression was so grave that
the states were powerless to control a nationwide problem.
Roosevelt recognized early on that his program risked
antagonizing the federal courts, which were filled with
Republican judges.39 He could count on the opposition of Justices
James McReynolds, Willis Van Devanter, George Sutherland,
and Pierce Butler, known as “The Four Horsemen,”40 for their
skepticism toward government regulation of the economy and
their defense of individual economic rights. But FDR believed he
could expect the general support of progressives Justices Louis
Brandeis, Harlan Fiske Stone, and Benjamin Cardozo. Chief
Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Justice Owen Roberts held
the swing votes. FDR hoped that the Court would grant the
political branches more constitutional leeway to respond to the

business entry); Williams v. Standard Oil Co., 278 U.S. 235, 239 (1929) (finding
legislature may not authorize state agencies to set gasoline prices sold in the state);
Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525, 560 (1923) (finding state mandated minimum
wages, for women and children, interfered with an individual’s constitutional liberty to
contract); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161, 180 (1908) (holding a federal labor law
prohibiting employee termination or discrimination based on labor organization
membership unconstitutional); JESSE H. CHOPER, ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW – CASES,
COMMENTS, QUESTIONS 292 (9th ed. 2001).
37 National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (1935); Public Utility Holding
Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 79 (1935); Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7 (1935).
38 Robert L. Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933–1946, 59
HARV. L. REV. 645, 683 (1946).
39 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, THE SUPREME COURT REBORN: THE CONSTITUTIONAL
REVOLUTION IN THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT 83–84 (1995).
40 Id. at 3.
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national crisis of the Great Depression. In previous national
security emergencies, the courts had allowed the federal
government to mobilize the economy with little objection. FDR
had reason for these hopes in early 1934, after 5–4 majorities of
the Court upheld state laws setting milk prices and delaying
mortgage payments.41
Those hopes were dashed with the opening of the Court’s
business in January 1935. In its first case examining a New Deal
law, an 8–1 majority of the Court invalidated the NRA’s “hot oil”
provision, which allowed the executive branch to prohibit the
interstate transportation of petroleum produced in violation of
quotas.42 Chief Justice Hughes wrote that the provision
unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the president.43
That decision was only a preview to May 27, 1935—known as
“Black Monday” to New Dealers44—when the Court struck down
three New Deal laws. The centerpiece was the Court’s
unanimous rejection of the NRA in the “Sick Chicken” case,
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry v. United States, in which the owners of
a chicken slaughterhouse were prosecuted for violating industrial
codes of conduct.45
In finding the NRA unconstitutional, the Justices threatened
the two core features of the New Deal. Schechter Poultry held
that the Constitution prohibited Congress from delegating
legislative power to the president, especially when rulemaking
authority was then sub-delegated to private industry groups.46
The NRA also violated the Constitution’s limits on the reach of
federal economic power.47 The owners of the slaughterhouse sold
their chickens into a local market, which did not directly impact
interstate commerce, even though a high percentage of chickens
came from out of state. If the Court were to keep to its precedent
that intra-state manufacturing and agriculture lay outside
federal authority, more pillars of the New Deal—perhaps even
the whole program itself—might collapse. In pointed language,
the Court specifically rejected the Roosevelt administration’s
overarching approach to the Great Depression: “Extraordinary
conditions do not create or enlarge constitutional power.”48

41 See Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 425–28 (1934); see also
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934).
42 Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 405, 433 (1935).
43 Id. at 431–33.
44 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 39, at 89.
45 A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. U.S., 295 U.S. 495, 508 (1935).
46 Id. at 550.
47 Id.
48 Id. at 528.
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FDR responded with a political attack on the Court. In a
ninety-minute press conference, the President declared Schechter
Poultry to be the most significant judicial decision since Dred
Scott.49 While critical of the Court’s ruling on executive power, he
believed that those problems could be fixed by re-writing the
statutes to give more direction and less delegation.50 It was
Schechter’s narrow view of the Commerce Clause that posed the
real threat to the New Deal. If Congress could not regulate the
activities of the butchers because they were local in nature, it
would be unable to police most other manufacturing or
agricultural enterprises. “The whole tendency over these years
has been to view the interstate commerce clause in the light of
present-day civilization,” Roosevelt told the press. “We are
interdependent—we are tied together.”51 To Roosevelt, the Justices’
way of thinking failed to take account of the national character of
the economy. “We have been relegated to a horse-and-buggy
definition of interstate commerce.”52
FDR considered a variety of proposals if the Court were to
continue ruling against the New Deal: increasing the number of
Justices (giving the president enough new appointments to
change the balance on the Court), reducing the Court’s
jurisdiction, or requiring a supermajority of Justices to declare a
federal law unconstitutional. He rejected them all as premature,
but he had been prepared to respond to a potential rejection of
the prohibition on gold transactions with a declaration of a
national emergency, a fixed price for gold, and an attack on the
Court for “imperil[ing] the economic and political security of this
nation.”53 But the Court upheld the gold regulations, causing
Roosevelt to shelve his plans.54
The administration continued to work with Congress to
expand federal intervention in the economy. Known as the
Second New Deal, these laws went beyond the simple, sweeping
delegations of authority to the president in the NRA or the AAA.
New laws such as the National Labor Relations Act and the
Social Security Act created specialized bureaucracies to handle
discrete areas of economic regulation. While the First New Deal
vested the president with emergency powers to handle the
Depression, the Second New Deal of 1935–1936 promised
49

at 221.

THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note 13,
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54 See Norman v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240, 316 (1935).
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permanent government intervention in the economy. One of
FDR’s political achievements was to transform the social contract
so that government benefits became understood as rights—rights
just as real to many Americans as those in the Constitution
itself. But they did nothing to avoid the constitutional problems
of the First New Deal: Their very success depended on their
ability to regulate all economic activity, rather than just trade
that crossed interstate borders.
The Court, however, stuck to its guns. Rather than cower
before this second outburst of lawmaking, in the spring of 1936,
it declared unconstitutional more elements of the New Deal. In
United States v. Butler, the Court held unconstitutional the
AAA’s use of taxes and grants to regulate agricultural
production, which lay within the reserved powers of the states.55
Butler threatened the Social Security Act, which used a
combination of taxes and spending to provide relief and pensions
to the unemployed and elderly.
In Carter v. Carter Coal Co., a 5–4 majority struck down a
1935 law that set prices, wages, hours, and collective bargaining
rules for the coal industry.56 The Court found that the production
of coal did not amount to interstate commerce, but instead fell
within the reserved powers of the states.57 “[T]he effect of the
labor provisions . . . primarily falls upon production and not upon
commerce,” Justice Sutherland wrote for the majority.58
“Production is a purely local activity.”59 Carter made clear that
the sick chicken case was not a fluke; any federal regulation of
intra-state industrial production or agriculture was now in
constitutional doubt. In Jones v. SEC, the Justices attacked the
proceedings of the Securities and Exchange Commission as
“odious” and “pernicious” and compared it to the “intolerable
abuses of the Star Chamber.”60 Morehead v. Tipaldo held that
New York’s minimum wage law violated the Due Process Clause,
just as it had earlier found that such laws interfered with the
right to contract.61 As the Court had already found a federal
minimum wage in the District of Columbia unconstitutional
in the 1920s, it had made the regulation of wages, in FDR’s
words, a “no-man’s land” forbidden to both the federal and
state governments.
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Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 316–17 (1936).
Id. at 303.
Id. at 304.
Id.
Jones v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 298 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1936).
Morehead v. N.Y. ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587, 618 (1936).

Do Not Delete

218

3/5/18 1:46 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

In the space of just two years, the Court had ripped apart the
central features of the First New Deal and was promising the
same for the Second. Roosevelt stopped discussing the Court’s
decisions publicly and did not make any proposals about the
Court during his re-election campaign. He attacked business and
the rich as “economic royalists” and the “privileged princes of
these new economic dynasties.”62 Roosevelt proposed a new
economic order that would provide stability and security through
new forms of government-provided rights. FDR reconceived
rights from the negative—preventing the state from intruding on
an individual liberty—to the positive—a minimum wage, the
right to organize, national working standards, and old-age
pensions. Running against the lackluster Republican Alf Landon,
FDR secured one of the great electoral victories in American
history: 523 electoral votes to Landon’s eight (the largest
advantage ever recorded in a contested two-party election in
American history), every state but Maine and Vermont, more
than sixty percent of the popular vote, and a Democratic
Congress with two-thirds majorities in both Houses, including
seventy-five of the ninety-six seats in the Senate.63 Observers
could legitimately question whether the Republican Party would
shortly disappear as a political force.
Fresh off his victory, FDR proposed a restructuring of the
Court that would eliminate it as an opponent of the New Deal.
On February 5, 1937, he sent Congress a judiciary “reform” bill
that would add a new Justice to the Court for every one over the
age of seventy. Because of the advanced age of several Justices,
Roosevelt’s proposal would have allowed him to appoint six new
Court members. Rather than criticize the Court for its opposition
to the New Deal, Roosevelt disingenuously claimed that the
elderly Justices were delaying the efficient administration of
justice.64 In his message to Congress, FDR pointed out that the
Court had denied review in 695 out of 803 cases.65 How can it be
“that full justice is achieved when a court is forced by the sheer
necessity of keeping up with its business to decline, without even
an explanation, to hear 87 percent of the cases presented to it by
private litigants?”66

62 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Acceptance Speech for the Renomination for the
Presidency, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT (June 27, 1936), http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15314 [http://perma.cc/L5AP-L8NL].
63 Election of 1936, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY PROJECT, http://www.presidency.
ucsb.edu/showelection.php?year=1936 [http://perma.cc/XQ93-MFHY].
64 81 Cong. Rec. 878 (1937) (reprinting FDR’s message to Congress).
65 Id.
66 Id.
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Only indirectly did FDR imply a link between the advanced
age of the Justices and their opposition to the New Deal. “Modern
complexities call also for a constant infusion of new blood in the
courts,” FDR wrote.67 “A lowered mental or physical vigor leads
men to avoid an examination of complicated and changed
conditions. Little by little, new facts become blurred through old
glasses fitted, as it were, for the needs of another generation.”68
FDR declared that the remedy would bring a “constant and
systematic addition of younger blood” that would “vitalize the
courts and better equip them to recognize and apply the essential
concepts of justice in the light of the needs and the facts of an
ever-changing world.”69 The President’s purpose could not have
been clearer. He submitted the plan on the Friday before the
Court would hear Monday arguments challenging the
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act, one of the
pillars of the Second New Deal.
Despite his electoral success, FDR’s court-packing plan—the
first domestic initiative of his second term—suffered a humiliating
defeat. Mail and telegrams to Congress went nine-to-one against
the plan, and polling showed a majority of the country opposed.70
Elements of the New Deal coalition, such as farmers and some
unions, attacked the plan early. Senate Republicans unified in
opposition shortly after the President announced his proposal,
and conservative Senate Democrats came out against the plan
within days. Several liberal supporters of the New Deal followed.
Hatton Sumners, the chairman of the House Judiciary Committee,
organized a majority of his committee against the bill, saying
“[b]oys . . . here’s where I cash in my chips.”71 Various college and
university presidents, academics, and the American Bar
Association opposed the plan. The coup de grace was delivered by
none other than Chief Justice Hughes, in a letter made public
during Senate Judiciary Committee hearings, who rebutted point
by point FDR’s claims that the Court was overworked and that
the older Justices could not perform their duties. Both Brandeis
and Van Devanter approved the letter, which most historians
believe ended the court-packing plan for good. Upon its release,
Vice President Garner called FDR in Georgia to tell him,
“We’re licked.”72
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Historians and political scientists have argued ever since
over how, or even whether, FDR still won the war. On March 29,
1937, a week after the release of the Hughes letter, the
Court handed down a 5–4 decision upholding a Washington
state minimum wage law for women.73 In West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish, the lineup of votes for and against New York’s
minimum wage, which had been struck down in Tipaldo the year
before, remained the same—except for Justice Roberts, who
switched sides to uphold the law.74 Overruling the earlier bans on
minimum wage laws, Parrish made clear that the Due Process
Clause would no longer stand in the way of government
regulation of wages or hours.
Two weeks later, the Court upheld the National Labor
Relations Act, which had been challenged on the same grounds
raised in the Sick Chicken and Carter cases.75 In NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., Chief Justice Hughes led a 5–4 majority
in rejecting the doctrine that manufacturing did not constitute
interstate commerce. Jones & Laughlin Steel was the fourthlargest steel company in the nation, with operations in multiple
states. As the Court observed, “the stoppage of those operations
by industrial strife would have a most serious effect upon
interstate commerce.”76 “It is obvious,” the Court found, that the
effect “would be immediate and might be catastrophic.”77
Henceforth, the Court would allow federal regulation of the
economy, even of wholly intrastate activity, because of the
interconnectedness of the national market. To do otherwise
would be to “shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our national
life” and to judge questions of interstate commerce “in an
intellectual vacuum.”78 Justice Roberts again switched positions
to make the 5–4 majority possible.
The Court’s about-face sapped the strength from FDR’s
court-packing campaign. By May 1937, it appeared that an
outright majority of the Senate opposed the proposal, and opinion
polls showed that only one third of the public supported it.79 At
the end of the month, the Senate Judiciary Committee reported

See W. Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
Id. at 379.
75 See generally NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937);
NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry Marks
Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937); Assoc. Press v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 103 (1937); Wash., Va. &
Md. Coach Co. v. NLRB, 301 U.S. 142 (1937).
76 Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. at 41.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 TOM S. CLARK, THE POLITICS OF JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE: COURTS, POLITICS, AND
THE PUBLIC 140 (Bruce Peabody eds., 2011).
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the bill out with an unfavorable recommendation.80 Two more
events finished things. Justice Van Devanter announced his
retirement, timed for the same day as the Judiciary Committee
vote, giving Roosevelt his first Supreme Court appointment. His
departure would give the New Deal a secure majority on the
Court. The Court also upheld the Social Security Act from attack
as an unconstitutional spending measure or an invasion of state
sovereignty.81 The court-packing bill lost all momentum, never
emerged from the House Judiciary Committee, and never
reached a floor vote.
While FDR lost in Congress, he had won his larger objective.
The Court would not strike down another regulation of interstate
commerce for almost sixty years. Journalists and political
scientists immediately attributed the “switch in time that saved
nine” to FDR’s threat to pack the Court.82 Even today, a few
creative scholars like Bruce Ackerman defend the sweeping
constitutional changes of the New Deal—which, unlike
Reconstruction, were never written into a constitutional
amendment—with the 1936 electoral landslide and the attack on
the Court.83 More recent work claims that the Court’s
jurisprudence was evolving in a more generous direction toward
federal power anyway.84 The Court, this work points out, had
confidentially voted to uphold the minimum wage in West Coast
Hotel on December 19, 1936, six weeks before FDR sprung his
proposal on the nation.85 The court-packing legislation could not
have pressured the Court because it obviously had little chance of
passage. The argument that the 1936 elections prodded the
Justices to switch positions on the New Deal also suffers from the
absence of the Court as an issue during the campaign.86 If
anything, FDR suffered politically from his confrontation with
the Court. A growing bipartisan coalition against the New Deal
and another sharp recession in 1938 stalled FDR’s domestic
agenda for the rest of his presidency.
Nonetheless, if FDR is considered a great president because
of the New Deal, critical to his success was his willingness to

Cushman, supra note 70, at 222–23.
See, e.g., Charles C. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 598 (1937);
Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 645 (1937).
82 See, e.g., JOSEPH ALSOP & TURNER CATLEDGE, THE 168 DAYS (1938); MERLO J.
PUSEY, THE SUPREME COURT CRISIS (1937).
83 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 105–30 (First Harv. Univ.
Press 1993).
84 See generally CUSHMAN, supra note 1.
85 Id. at 18.
86 See, e.g., Adrian Vermeule, Political Constraints on Supreme Court Reform, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1154, 1159 (2005–2006); Leuchtenburg, supra note 53, at 379.
80
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advance his own understanding of the Constitution. FDR never
accepted the Court’s right to define the powers of the federal
government to regulate the economy. While FDR did not join
Lincoln’s blatant defiance in declining to obey a judicial order, his
administration regularly proposed laws that ran counter to
Supreme Court precedent, and FDR openly questioned the
competence of the judiciary to review the New Deal.87 He sought
to change the Court’s composition and size as a means to
pressure it to change its rulings. With the retirement of the Four
Horsemen, Roosevelt would appoint Hugo Black, Stanley Reed,
Felix Frankfurter, and William O. Douglas to the Court, and by
1941, eight of the nine Justices were his appointees. While they
would fight about the application of the Bill of Rights against
the states, among other issues, they would unanimously agree
that Congress’s powers to regulate the economy were almost
without limit.88
In its call for a peacetime state of emergency, the New Deal
went beyond changes to the balance of powers between the
federal and state governments. Times of war inevitably shift
Constitutional power and responsibility to the president as
commander and chief. FDR and the New Deal Congress created
an administrative state that had the same effect in times of
peace, but which would be permanent, rather than temporary.
Laws enacted in the first 100 days and in the years after vested
sweeping legislative powers in the executive branch. The
executive branch, in turn, became the fount of legislative
proposals. FDR’s bills to cut federal spending and veterans’
benefits to balance the budget passed with alacrity.
The effort to engage in rational administration made the
executive branch the locus of regulation—issued through agency
rulemaking, rather than acts of Congress—as the federal
government took on the job of regulating the securities markets,
banks, labor unions, industrial working conditions, and
production standards. Victory, in the context of the Depression,
was all the more difficult because, whereas war requires the
rationing of scarce resources in favor of military production,
ending the Depression required stimulating demand and
production of all manner of goods, essentially altering millions of
market decisions made every day.

87 President Franklin D. Roosevelt, 46 – Fireside Chat, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PROJECT (Mar. 9, 1937), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=15381 [http://perma.cc/
9SVA-LHFJ].
88 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
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The New Deal’s resemblance to mobilization relied upon a
government bureaucracy more typical of wartime. America’s
administrative state had grown in ebbs and flows, with the early
Hamiltonian vision of a state centered around the Treasury
Department and the Bank, Jefferson’s embargo machinery, and
the massive departments of the Civil War representing the
high-water marks. With the creation of the Interstate Commerce
Commission in 1887, the American administrative state started
to grow in earnest. Progressive-era efforts to create national
administration to manage discrete economic and social issues
culminated in the World War I mobilization effort, which
included everything from production quotas to press censorship.89
Between 1887 and 1932, Congress created a few new agencies to
oversee aspects of the economy, such as railroad rates, business
competition, and the money supply.90 These early examples set
the precedent of delegating lawmaking authority to the executive
branch to set the actual rules governing private conduct.
FDR supplemented the New Deal’s delegation of legislative
authority to the executive branch by further enshrining the
presidency as the focal point of political life. Even before his
election, FDR had made clear that the candidate, not the party,
would be the center of the campaign by renting a small plane to
fly to Chicago to accept his nomination in person—the first
nominee of either major party to do so.91 Once in office, he used
new technology to reach over the heads of Congress and the
media. Radio allowed the President to forge a direct relationship
with the American electorate that went unfiltered by the
newspapers. His famous “fireside chats,” the first delivered on
the day before the government reopened the banks on March 13,
1933, allowed FDR to campaign for his policies directly with
the people. Roosevelt did not neglect the press either; he held
twice-a-week, off-the-record press conferences in the Oval Office,
where reporters could ask him any question they liked.92 He

89 See, e.g., DAVID M. KENNEDY, OVER HERE: THE FIRST WORLD WAR AND AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1980); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE
EXPANSION OF NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES 1877–1920 (1982); ROBERT H.
WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER, 1877–1920 (1966).
90 Following the creation of the Interstate Commerce Commission in 1887, Congress
authorized the creation of the Department of Labor and Commerce, the Food and Drug
Administration, The Bureau of Investigation (later the Federal Bureau of Investigation),
the Federal Reserve, and the Federal Trade Commission.
91 Thomas Hardy, FDR’s Nomination, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, http://www.chicago
tribune.com/news/nationworld/politics/chi-chicagodays-fdrnomination-story-story.html
[http://perma.cc/5ZAE-JFC2] (last visited Nov. 19, 2017).
92 Jean Edward Smith, Obama, F.D.R. and Taming the Press, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 2, 2009, 6:15 PM), https://100days.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/02/02/obama-fdr-andtaming-the-press/.
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employed his ample charm to win over the reporters, who burst
out in applause after the first press conference on March 8, 1933.93
FDR used these tools to marshal support for his legislative
program and to change the political culture. Under Roosevelt, the
president became the driving force for positive government,
rather than the leader of a political system where power was
dispersed among the branches of government, the states, and the
political parties.94 If the presidency were to play this leading role,
it had to strengthen its control over the executive branch itself.
In order to fulfill the promise of economic stability, the President
wanted full command over the varied programs and policies of
the government. This challenge was compounded by the New
Deal’s blizzard of new commissions and agencies, such as the
National Recovery Administration, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, and the Federal Communications Commission, as
well as the lack of a rational government structure that matched
form to function. When Congress enacted New Deal legislation, it
rarely reduced the size or shape of federal agencies, often simply
creating an additional agency or layer of bureaucracy on top of
the existing ones.
Roosevelt sought to master the executive branch in various
ways, with limited success. He expanded the use of aides
attached to the White House to develop and implement policy
instead of governing through the cabinet. FDR brought in a
“Brain Trust,” many of them academics who had advised him
during the 1932 campaign to develop legislation, draft speeches,
and manage policy. Some were located in the White House, and
others were spread in appointed positions in the agencies, but
they all worked for the President.
Cabinet meetings became primarily ceremonial occasions.
Rather, policy development evolved into the form familiar today,
with meetings between the president and chosen advisors—be
they White House staff, cabinet officers, agency staff, or special
committees including some combination of the former—assuming
a central role.95 The cabinet as a whole no longer represented
leaders of important factions within the president’s party, nor did
there seem to be a guiding principle behind individual
appointments. As James MacGregor Burns has observed, “[t]he
real significance of the cabinet lay in Roosevelt’s leadership role.
He could count on loyalty from his associates; almost everyone
was ‘FRBC’—for Roosevelt before Chicago” (where the Democratic

93
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MARC LANDY & SIDNEY MILKIS, PRESIDENTIAL GREATNESS 153–54 (2000).
BURNS, supra note 1, at 174.
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Party nominated FDR in 1932).96 The declining importance of the
cabinet, both in its corporeal form and in its individual members,
naturally enhanced the control of the White House over
the government.
FDR used his removal power to direct policy, following the
examples set by Lincoln, Jackson, and Washington. He fired the
head of the Federal Power Commission, whom Hoover had
appointed, and replaced him with his own man, even though
legislation appeared to give the Commission itself the authority
to choose the chairman.97 As the United States came closer to
entry into World War II, he summarily dismissed his Secretaries
of War and Navy and replaced them with internationalist
Republicans without serious opposition from Congress or his
own party.
FDR also used his removal power to seek control over the
independent agencies. Unlike the core departments, such as
State, War, Treasury, and Justice, independent agencies were
designed by Congress to be less amenable to presidential
direction.98 Their organizing statutes usually create a
multi-member commission at the top with a required balance
between the political parties. In some cases, Congress shields the
commission members from presidential removal except for cause
(for malfeasance in office or for violating the law). Congress uses
these devices to delegate the power to make legislative rules,
while keeping the ability to influence its exercise and preventing
its direct transfer to presidential control. Until FDR, presidents
were generally understood to have the constitutional ability to
freely remove commissioners even in the presence of these “for
cause” protections against removal, though it is unclear to what
extent previous presidents, in fact, used this authority.99
Upon taking office, FDR decided to replace the head of the
Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”), William Humphrey, a
Hoover administration appointee. The FTC had a potential role
in overseeing important New Deal programs due to its
responsibility to investigate “unfair methods of competition in
Id. at 150.
Christopher Yoo, Steven Calabresi & Laurence Nee, The Unitary Executive During
the Third Half-Century, 1889–1945, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 83–84 (2004).
98 The classic work on the origins of the independent agencies remains ROBERT E.
CUSHMAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSIONS (1941). For more recent
analysis, see Geoffrey P. Miller, Independent Agencies, 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 41 (1986);
Peter L. Strauss, The Place of Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the
Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 573 (1984); and Paul R. Verkuil, The Status of
Independent Agencies after Bowsher v. Synar, 1986 DUKE L.J. 779 (1986).
99 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE:
PRESIDENTIAL POWER FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 284–88 (2008).
96
97
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commerce,”100 a broad jurisdictional grant of authority that
allowed it to sue companies for monopolistic activity. The statute
establishing the FTC allowed removal of a commissioner only in
cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”101
FDR decided to remove Humphrey only because he wanted to
have his own man in the job. FDR wrote Humphrey: “You will, I
know, realize that I do not feel that your mind and my mind go
along together on either the policies or the administering of the
Federal Trade Commission[.]”102 When Humphrey refused to
leave, FDR fired him. Congress did not complain, and instead
promptly confirmed FDR’s nomination of a new FTC chairman.
Humphrey, however, remained undaunted and sued to recover
his pay for the rest of his term.
Four years later, Humphrey’s estate eventually took his case
to the Supreme Court, which dealt Roosevelt and the presidency
a serious blow.103 The Justice Department argued that the FTC
statute was an unconstitutional infringement on the president’s
removal power and his constitutional duty to faithfully execute
the laws.104 Roosevelt’s lawyers relied on Myers v. United States,
a nine-year-old case that had struck down a law requiring Senate
consent before a president could fire a postmaster.105 In Myers,
Chief Justice (and former president) William Howard Taft wrote:
“The vesting of the executive power in the President was
essentially a grant of the power to execute the laws. But the
President alone and unaided could not execute the laws. He must
execute them by the assistance of subordinates.”106 Taft concluded
that the president’s duty to implement the laws required that “he
should select those who were to act for him under his direction”
and that he must also have the “power of removing those for
whom he cannot continue to be responsible.”107 Based on this
precedent, FDR seemed on safe ground.
On the same day that it decided Schechter Poultry, May 27,
1935, the Court substantially revised its removal jurisprudence.
With Justice Sutherland writing, the majority held that the FTC
“cannot in any proper sense be characterized as an arm or
an eye of the executive.”108 Creating a wholly new category of
100 Robert E. Freer, The Work of the Federal Trade Commission, FEDERAL TRADE
COMMISSION (Mar. 23, 1936), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_
statements/675261/19360323_freer_the_work_of_the_ftc.pdf.
101 Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 620 (1935).
102 Id. at 619.
103 See generally id.
104 Yoo, Calabresi & Nee, supra note 97, at 85.
105 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 176 (1926).
106 Id. at 117.
107 Id.
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government, Sutherland described the FTC’s functions as “quasi
legislative or quasi judicial” because it investigated and reported
to Congress and conducted initial adjudications on claims of anticompetitive violations before a case went to federal court.109 The
FTC acted “as an agency of the legislative or judicial
departments,” and was “wholly disconnected from the executive
department[.]”110 Myers, and the president’s discretionary
removal authority, only applied to “purely executive” officers
such as the Secretary of State or a postmaster.111
The decision has long been puzzling, especially its
recognition of a fourth branch of government that falls outside
the three mentioned in the Constitution. Further, the reasoning
in Humphrey’s Executor has shriveled on the vine. Recent cases
continue to recognize Congress’s authority to shield certain
government agents (such as the independent counsel) from
removal even when they fall within the executive branch, not
because they perform quasi legislative or judicial functions, but
because their independence is critical to their functions.112
Another oddity is that FDR’s loss in Humphrey’s Executor came
at the hands of Justice Sutherland and the conservatives on the
Court, who were (as we shall see), otherwise strong supporters of
executive power, albeit in foreign affairs.
As they demonstrated in other decisions, the Justices were
concerned with the New Deal’s great expansion of federal power.
They may have believed that one way to blunt the progressive
centralization of power in the national government was to force
the executive to disperse that power once at the federal level.113
Not surprisingly, Congress found the Court’s approach quite
congenial. It could delegate authority to the executive branch
while preventing the president from exercising direct control
over the agency. With the executive branch thus defanged,
independent agencies naturally became more responsive to
congressional wishes, which controlled their funding and held
oversight hearings into their activities. And since the agencies
were still formally within the executive branch, Congress could
have its cake and eat it too, disclaiming any official responsibility
for unpopular regulatory decisions. After Humphrey’s Executor,
Congress added “for cause” limitations on removal for members
Humphrey’s Executor, 295 U.S. at 628.
Id. at 628–29.
Id. at 628.
111 Id. at 632.
112 See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361 (1989).
113 See HADLEY ARKES, THE RETURN OF GEORGE SUTHERLAND: RESTORING A
JURISPRUDENCE OF NATURAL RIGHTS 37 (1994).
108
109
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of the National Labor Relations Board, the Civil Aeronautics
Board, and the Federal Reserve Board.114
Creation of the permanent administrative state strained the
presidency. With the Supreme Court and Congress limiting the
main constitutional tool of executive control, independent
agencies might be able to pursue policies at odds with the
president’s understanding of federal law. Or they might press
policy mandates in a way that caused conflict with other
agencies, created redundancies, or ran counter to other federal
policies. A number of methods for taming the behemoth were
possible. Presidents could impose order by forcing the menagerie
of departments, commissions, and agencies to act according to a
common plan, and thereby coordinate the activities of the
government rationally; the administrative state could be freed of
direct control by either the president or Congress, and instead be
subject to a variety of checks and balances by all three branches;
or the agencies could work closely with private business and
interest groups, which would raise objections to agency action
with the courts, Congress, and the White House.
FDR rejected the idea that the administrative state should
float outside the Constitution’s traditional structure, and he
continued to fire the heads of agencies even when Congress had
arguably limited his power of removal. FDR, for example,
removed the chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority in
1938, even though Congress had established that he could only
be fired for applying political tests or any other standards but
“merit and efficiency” in running the agency.115 The chairman
had attacked his Tennessee Valley Authority colleagues and had
declared that he took orders from Congress, not the president.
FDR removed him on the ground that the Executive Power and
Take Care Clauses of the Constitution required that he control
his subordinates.116 FDR established various super-cabinet
entities with names like the Executive Council, the National
Emergency Council, and the Industrial Emergency Committee,
composed of cabinet officers, commission heads, and White House

Yoo, Calabresi & Nee, supra note 97, at 88–89.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, The President Transmits to the Congress the Record of the
Removal of the Chairman of the Tennessee Valley Authority (Mar. 23, 1938), in 7 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 151–53, 162–63 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1942).
116 The federal courts upheld FDR’s decision, ultimately holding that Congress had
failed to clearly prevent the President from firing on other grounds in addition to criteria
it listed. See Morgan v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 28 F. Supp. 732, 737 (E.D. Tenn. 1939), aff’d,
115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940); see also Yoo, Calabresi & Nee, supra note 97, at 89–90.
114
115
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staff.117 None of these improvisations provided a structural
solution to the challenge posed by the administrative state, as
these various bodies proved a poor forum for rational planning
and control over the varied arms of the federal government.
FDR’s last thrust to control the administrative state
required the cooperation of Congress. In 1936, the President
asked a commission, headed by administration expert Louis
Brownlow, to recommend institutional changes for the improved
governance of the administrative state.118 A year later, it
reported: “the President needs help.”119 Its bottom line was clear.
“[M]anagerial direction and control of all departments and
agencies of the Executive Branch,” Brownlow wrote, “should be
centered in the President[.]”120
According to Brownlow, the President’s political responsibilities
dwarfed his formal authorities. “[W]hile he now has popular
responsibility for this direction,” the committee reported, “he is
not equipped with adequate legal authority or administrative
machinery to enable him to exercise it[.]”121 Brownlow and FDR,
who approved the report, held the usual concern that the
administrative state was wasteful, redundant, and contradictory,
but more importantly, they worried that it would become
so independent as to lose touch with the people.122 The
administrative state suffered from a democracy deficit.
The Brownlow Committee concluded that Congress must
give the president more management resources, while keeping
the chief executive at the center of decision-making. It advised
that to make “our Government an up-to-date, efficient, and
effective instrument for carrying out the will of the Nation,”
presidential control must be enhanced.123 It recommended the
creation of a new entity, the Executive Office of the President
(which would house the Bureau of the Budget), six new White
House assistants to the president, centralization of the
government’s budgets and planning, and the merger of
independent agencies into the cabinet departments.124 Brownlow’s
report did not call for a professional secretariat that would
117 See Exec. Order No. 6202-A, Appointing the Executive Council (July 11, 1933);
Exec. Order No. 6433-A, Creation of the National Emergency Council (Nov. 17, 1933);
Exec. Order No. 6770, Creating the Industrial Emergency Committee (June 30, 1934).
118 P ERI A RNOLD , M AKING THE M ANAGERIAL P RESIDENCY : C OMPREHENSIVE
REORGANIZATION PLANNING, 1905–1996, at 94 (1986).
119 Id. at 81.
120 Id. at 103.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 104–07.
123 Id. at 104.
124 Id.
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supervise the activities of the government, as existed in Great
Britain. Rather, the new assistants to the president and the
Bureau of the Budget would provide information to the president
and carry out his orders, with Roosevelt still making all critical
policy decisions.125 By centralizing the administrative state under
the presidency, it would become directly accountable to Congress
and the American people. “Strong executive leadership is
essential to democratic government today,” the report
concluded.126 “Our choice is not between power and no power, but
between responsible but capable popular government and
irresponsible autocracy.”127
FDR had the report’s recommendations distilled into a bill he
presented to the congressional leadership in January 1937. In a
four-hour presentation, FDR personally laid out the plan and
declared: “The President’s task has become impossible for me or
any other man. A man in this position will not be able to survive
White House service unless it is simplified. I need executive
assistants with a ‘passion for anonymity’ to be my legs.”128 Even
though the 75th Congress began with a two-thirds Democratic
majority, it was wary of FDR’s plans and less than thrilled at the
prospect of greater presidential influence over the New Deal
state. Roosevelt’s plan undermined the benefits to Congress of
delegation because it would weaken Congress’s influence over
agency decisions while expanding the president’s authority over
what was essentially lawmaking.
Brownlow’s report landed before Congress at the same time
as FDR’s court-packing plan. While the two plans addressed
different problems, they fed the same fear of presidential
aggrandizement at the expense of the other branches. Key
congressional leaders had not been consulted or briefed on the
reorganization plan, which they proceeded to attack as another
step toward despotism, or a power grab by the university
intellectuals who no doubt would run the new agencies. At a time
when totalitarianism was raising its ugly head in Europe, fears
of consolidated executive power were particularly salient. In
1938, the bill failed in the House and was replaced by a more
modest bill that gave FDR a limited ability to reorganize
government.129 Under that authority, FDR still managed to

125 See MATTHEW DICKINSON, BITTER HARVEST: FDR, PRESIDENTIAL POWER, AND THE
GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH 104–10 (1996).
126 THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 106 (Robert F.
Durant ed., 2010).
127 Id.
128 DICKINSON, supra note 125, at 111.
129 LEUCHTENBURG, supra note 1, at 277–80.
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locate the Bureau of the Budget within a new Executive Office of
the President. As the Office of Management and Budget, it today
exercises central review over the economic costs and benefits of
all federal regulation, one of the president’s most powerful tools
for rationalizing the activities of the administrative state.130
FDR also expanded the resources within the White House,
an institution now separate from the Executive Office of the
President, which enabled him to gain more information and
control over the cabinet agencies. Still, the independent agencies
remained outside the cabinet departments. FDR never
successfully established any single entity to coordinate the
activities of the entire administrative state, and his failed bill
demonstrates the enduring constitutional checks on the
presidency. Despite FDR’s growing power, only Congress could
pass the laws needed to reorganize the cabinet departments,
re-shape the jurisdiction and structure of the independent
agencies, and provide the funds and positions in a new,
revitalized White House.131
While FDR suffered defeats at the hands of Congress, he
continued to claim and exercise inherent executive authority that
went beyond mere control of personnel. He signed statements to
object to riders inserted into needed spending bills, which he
believed to be unconstitutional. Congress, for example, attempted
to force the President to fire three bureaucrats it believed were
“subversives” by specifically barring any federal funds to pay
their salaries.132 Roosevelt signed the bill but objected to its
unconstitutional end run around the president’s power over the
removal of executive branch officials. Ultimately, the officials left
within months, but they sued for their back pay all the way
to the Supreme Court, which agreed that Congress had violated
the Constitution.133
President Roosevelt also followed Lincoln’s example in using
his executive power to fight racial discrimination. Although
Lincoln had relied on his power as Commander-in-Chief to free

130 See, e.g., Christopher C. DeMuth & Douglas H. Ginsburg, White House Review of
Agency Decisionmaking, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1075 (1986); Alan B. Morrison, OMB
Interference with Agency Rulemaking: The Wrong Way to Write a Regulation, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1059 (1986); TERRY EASTLAND, ENERGY IN THE EXECUTIVE: THE CASE FOR THE
STRONG PRESIDENCY 163 (1992); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L.
REV. 2245 (2001).
131 On the way that presidents today manage policy development through the White
House and the Executive Office of the President, see ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, MANAGING
THE PRESIDENT’S PROGRAM: PRESIDENTIAL LEADERSHIP AND LEGISLATIVE POLICY
FORMATION 18–62 (2002).
132 See Urgent Deficiency Appropriation Act, ch. 218, §304, 57 Stat. 431, 450 (1943).
133 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
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the slaves, the southern states imposed racial segregation in the
years after the Civil War, ultimately with the approval of the
Supreme Court.134 While FDR did not take segregation head on,
he issued an executive order in 1941 to prohibit racial
discrimination in employment on federal defense contracts.135
Roosevelt had no statutory authority to order the federal
government to provide fair treatment in employment to all,
regardless of race. He could rely only upon his constitutional
authority as president to oversee the management of federal
programs. Once war began, President Roosevelt could clarify that
his orders were taken under his power as both Chief Executive
and Commander-in-Chief in wartime.136 FDR’s orders would
not be the first time, nor the last time, that the cause of
racial equality would depend on a broad understanding of
presidential power.
The New Deal depended upon broad theories of the
presidency and the role of the federal government in national
life. What remains less clear is whether FDR’s fundamental
re-orientation of the government into a positive, active
instrument of national policy was worthwhile. Contemporary
critics of the modern presidency question whether chief
executives, acting alone, have led the nation into disastrous
wars.137 We need also ask, but rarely do, whether the expansion
of executive power domestically has benefited the nation. To the
extent we debate the desirability of the administrative state,
most American scholars today bemoan the fact that the New
Deal did not go far enough. They argue that the New Deal failed
because it did not achieve a full-fledged European welfare state,
or that FDR’s coalition fragmented and failed to follow through
on the promise of liberal reform.138 These critics, often the most
vocal detractors of the muscular executive action in foreign
affairs, cry out for more executive power domestically.
Vesting the president with more authority to control the
government’s regulation of the economy may make sense during
an emergency, but it did not work in solving the Great
Depression. Economists recognize today that the New Deal
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 543, 548 (1896).
Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (June 27, 1941).
Exec. Order No. 9346, 8 Fed. Reg. 7183 (May 27, 1943).
137 See, e.g., Barry D. Karl, Constitution and Central Planning: The Third New Deal
Revisited, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 163, 188 (1988); Margaret Weir & Theda Skocpol, State
Structures and the Possibilities for “Keynesian” Responses to the Great Depression in
Sweden, Britain, and the United States, in BRINGING THE STATE BACK IN 107–08 (Peter B.
Evans et al. eds., 1985); THEDA SKOCPOL, PROTECTING SOLDIERS AND MOTHERS: THE
POLITICAL ORIGINS OF SOCIAL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (1995).
138 See RUDALEVIGE, supra note 131.
134
135
136
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neither put an end to high rates of unemployment nor restored
consistent economic growth.139 FDR’s monetary and fiscal policy
were often counterproductive. Full employment would return
only with American rearmament in the first years of World War
II. Other New Deal policies were similarly confused, such as
allowing industry to set production quotas, reduce production to
raise prices, and restrict employment by raising minimum wages.
Economists similarly doubt whether the creation of national
regulation of the securities markets and other industries
contributed to the eventual economic recovery, even though it
was certainly valuable for postwar prosperity. If, as Milton
Friedman argues, the Great Depression would have proven to be
only a normal recession with some deft monetary policy from the
Federal Reserve,140 it bears asking whether the expansive,
permanent bureaucracy was needed at all.
Decades later, American presidents would campaign against
the burdensome regulations made possible by the New Deal. The
administrative state we have today failed to end the Great
Depression. There is little doubt that the explosion in the size
and power of the administrative state has transformed the
nature of American politics. Considering this, was the
administrative state worth the price?
The federal government has dramatically expanded the
scope of regulation to include not only national economic activity,
such as workplace conditions and minimum wages and hours,
but also the environment and endangered species, educational
standards, state and local corruption, consumer product safety,
communications technology and ownership, illegal narcotics and
gun crimes, and corporate governance. It has produced less
deliberation in Congress, which now delegates sweeping powers
to the agencies, and has placed the initial authority to issue
federal law affecting private individuals in administrative
agencies. Those agencies are not directly accountable to the
people through elections, except for the thin layer of presidential
appointees at the very top. Special-interest groups have come to
play a significant role in influencing both congressional
committees and agencies, gaining economic “rents” for their
members at the expense of the broader public.

139 See, e.g., David M. Kennedy, What the New Deal Did, 124 POL. SCI. Q. 251, 252
(2009); Harold L. Cole & Lee E. Ohanian, New Deal Policies and the Persistence of the
Great Depression: A General Equilibrium Analysis, 112 J. POL. ECON. 779, 813 (2004);
BERNANKE, supra note 9; ARTHUR I. BLOOMFIELD, CAPITAL IMPORTS AND THE AMERICAN
BALANCE OF PAYMENTS 1934–39 (1950).
140 See FRIEDMAN & SCHWARTZ, supra note 3, at 249–69.
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This is not a plea to return to the laissez-faire capitalism of
the nineteenth century variety. The modern administrative state
no doubt has produced social benefits, and there are important
areas where the greater information and expertise held by the
executive agencies improves government policy, but it remains
an open question whether the centralization of economic and
social regulation in the national government has been, on
balance, a success. It is undeniable that the requirement of
minimum national standards, most especially in the area of civil
rights, was a necessary and long-overdue change. Equality under
law should not have been a matter of legislative or executive
discretion, but a requirement of the Reconstruction Amendments
to the Constitution. National control of other economic and social
issues, however, may not have been worth the cost in increased
government spending, larger budget deficits, a permanent
government apparatus of unprecedented size (at least in the
American experience), the rise of interest-group politics, and
interference with efficient market mechanisms.
Federal agencies may impose uniform rules, but they may
not impose the best rules. In the absence of broad national
regulation, states could enact a diversity of policies on issues
such as the economy, environment, education, crime, and social
policy. People could vote with their feet by moving to states that
adopt their preferred package of policies, while experimentation
could identify the most effective solutions to economic and social
problems. The New Deal’s concentration of regulatory authority
in Washington, D.C. sapped the vitality of the states, whose
powers are only a pale imitation of those they held in the
nineteenth century.141 FDR certainly deserves credit for restoring
Americans’ optimism and faith in government, and for alleviating
the suffering inflicted by the Depression, but it remains doubtful
whether the great wrenching in the fabric of our federal system
of government and the expansion in the president’s constitutional
powers in the domestic realm can be justified by any limited
advance in triggering a recovery. Despite its revolution in
domestic presidential power and government structure, the New
Deal appears to have had little impact on ending the worst
economic collapse in American history.

141 For a more extensive discussion of the transformation of American politics
wrought by the New Deal, see MILKIS, supra note 1, at 21–51, 149–83; and THEODORE J.
LOWI, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES 273–74
(2d ed. 1979).
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II. THE GATHERING STORM
FDR’s claim to greatness lies not in the New Deal, but in his
defeat of one of the greatest external threats our nation has
faced: fascist Germany and imperial Japan. FDR exercised
farsighted vision in preparing the nation for a necessary war
unwanted by a large minority, and at times a majority, of
Congress and the American people. In the process, the President
skirted, stretched, and broke a series of neutrality laws designed
to prevent American entry into World War II. Sometimes he went
to Congress and the American people to seek support for his
actions. Other times he did not. But, regardless of the where, or
if, FDR sought support for his actions in the lead up to war, FDR
firmly established that the power to make national security
policy resided in the Oval Office.142
Debate has raged for decades over whether the Japanese
attack on Pearl Harbor was a surprise, or whether FDR or the
American government had advance knowledge of the attack.
Some have suspected that FDR believed the only way to rouse a
reluctant American public to war was for the United States to be
attacked first. In this respect, FDR had the same instincts as
Lincoln. The conventional wisdom today attributes more of the
blame for Pearl Harbor to incompetence by the field commanders
and complacency in Washington, and has put to rest the idea
that FDR actually knew that the Japanese would attack
Pearl Harbor.143
Recent scholarly work suggests that FDR managed events to
maneuver the Japanese into a corner, with a strong possibility
that the Japanese would attack American interests somewhere in
the Pacific, most likely the Philippines. Roosevelt’s imposition of
142 See ROBERT DALLEK, FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY,
1932–1945, at 530–31 (1979). Important historical works on FDR and American entry
into World War II include: ROBERT DIVINE, THE ILLUSION OF NEUTRALITY (1962); WALDO
HEINRICHS, THRESHOLD OF WAR: FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT AND AMERICAN ENTRY INTO
WORLD WAR II (1988); PATRICK HEARDEN, ROOSEVELT CONFRONTS HITLER: AMERICA’S
ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II (1987); WARREN F. KIMBALL, THE JUGGLER: FRANKLIN
ROOSEVELT AS WARTIME STATESMAN (1991); FREDERICK W. MARKS III, WIND OVER SAND:
THE DIPLOMACY OF FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT (1988); DAVID REYNOLDS, THE CREATION OF
THE ANGLO-AMERICAN ALLIANCE 1937–1941: A STUDY IN COMPETITIVE CO-OPERATION
(1982); and AKIRA IRIYE, THE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR IN ASIA AND THE
PACIFIC (1987). The day-to-day events of American entry into World War II are traced in
WILLIAM L. LANGER & S. EVERETT GLEASON, THE UNDECLARED WAR: 1940–1941 (1953),
and the events leading up to World War II are described in DONALD C. WATT, HOW WAR
CAME: THE IMMEDIATE ORIGINS OF THE SECOND WORLD WAR, 1938–1939 (1990); and
JOHN KEEGAN, THE SECOND WORLD WAR (2005). U.S. diplomacy in the war itself is
discussed by AKIRA IRIYE, 3 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS:
THE GLOBALIZING OF AMERICA, 1913–1945 (1993).
143 For a summary of these debates, see GORDON PRANGE, ET. AL., AT DAWN WE
SLEPT: THE UNTOLD STORY OF PEARL HARBOR 474–76 (2001).
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an arms, steel, and oil embargo against the Japanese Empire was
designed to force Tokyo to either withdraw from China or attack
American, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia for natural
resources.144 FDR pressed Japan in order to bring the United
States to bear against the greater threat of Germany.145 FDR
could not have walked the United States to the brink of war
without an expansive interpretation of the president’s
constitutional powers and the willingness to exercise them.
Roosevelt had laid claim to sweeping executive authority in
foreign affairs even before war with Germany and Japan looked
certain. He was assisted, at times, from an unlikely source:
Justice Sutherland. While Sutherland believed the New Deal
state unconstitutionally trampled on the natural rights of
individuals, as Hadley Arkes has argued, he still strongly
supported presidential power in foreign affairs.146 This became
clear in the case United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.147
In 1934, Congress had delegated to the president the
authority to cut off all U.S. arms sales to Bolivia and Paraguay,
which were fighting a nasty border war, if he found the ban
would advance peace in the region.148 FDR proclaimed an arms
embargo in effect on the same day Congress passed the law,149
and the next day the Justice Department prosecuted four
executives of the Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation for trying
to sell fifteen machine guns to Bolivia.150 Curtiss-Wright, which
traced its roots to the Wright brothers, would supply the engines
for the DC-3 air transport and the B-17 Flying Fortress and
build the P-40 fighter.151 Taking its case all the way to the
Supreme Court, the company argued that the law had delegated
unconstitutional authority over international commerce to the
president.152 If Congress wanted to impose an arms embargo, it
would have to do it itself, not just hand the authority to FDR.
In a remarkable and controversial opinion, Justice
Sutherland declared that the constitutional standards that ruled
the government’s actions domestically did not apply in the same

144 See MARC TRACHTENBERG, THE CRAFT OF INTERNATIONAL HISTORY: A GUIDE TO
METHOD 79–139 (2006).
145 See MARKS III, supra note 142, at 163.
146 See ARKES, supra note 113, at 198–99.
147 299 U.S. 304, 319–20 (1936).
148 Id. at 312.
149 Id. at 313.
150 Id. at 311.
151 History, CURTISS-WRIGHT CORPORATION, http://www.curtisswright.com/company/
history/ [http://perma.cc/SB9A-XC8W] (last visited Sept. 14, 2017).
152 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 314–15.
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way to foreign affairs.153 The Constitution’s careful limitation of
the national government’s powers, so as to preserve the general
authority of the states, did not extend beyond the water’s edge.
In the arena of foreign affairs, Sutherland maintained, the
American Revolution had directly transferred the full powers of
national sovereignty from Great Britain to the Union. “The
powers to declare and wage war, to conclude peace, to make
treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with other
sovereignties,” Sutherland wrote, “if they had never been
mentioned in the Constitution, would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality.”154 In
words that could have been cribbed from Abraham Lincoln, the
Court declared that the “Union existed before the Constitution,”
and therefore the Union could exercise the same powers over war
and peace as any other nation.155
An argument in favor of exclusive federal power over
national security and international relations, however, does not
dictate which branch should exercise it. Sutherland located that
authority in the president for inherently practical considerations.
The dangers posed by foreign nations required the structural
ability to act swiftly and secretly, unique to the executive branch.
“In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.”156
Echoing Hamilton and Jefferson, and quoting then Congressman
John Marshall, Sutherland declared, “The President is the sole
organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole
representative with foreign nations.”157
Justice Sutherland notably eschewed the opportunity for a
narrow holding in conferring wide latitude to the executive
branch. It did not matter that, on the facts of Curtiss-Wright,
FDR was acting pursuant to congressional delegation. “We are
here dealing not alone with an authority vested in the President
by an exertion of legislative power, but with such an authority
plus the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of the
President,” which does not “require as a basis for its exercise an
See id. at 315–22.
Id. at 318. Scholars have not been kind to Justice Sutherland’s analysis. For a
critical discussion of Curtiss-Wright, see David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power:
An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467 (1946); Charles A.
Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1 (1973); and LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION 19–20 (2d ed. 1996).
155 Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. at 316.
156 Id. at 319.
157 Id.
153
154
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act of Congress.”158 Sutherland found great advantages to the
United States in vesting these powers in the executive, rather
than the legislature. The president, not Congress, “has the better
opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has
confidential sources of information.”159
Another case gave Justice Sutherland the opportunity to
deliver a second blessing to FDR’s vigorous use of his presidential
powers. In 1933, Roosevelt ended American efforts to isolate the
Soviet Union and unilaterally recognized its communist
government. As part of an executive agreement with the Soviets,
the United States took on all rights and claims of the USSR
against American citizens, such as those involving the
expropriation of property.160 The federal government sued to
recover money and property held by Russians in the United
States, which were allegedly owed to the Soviet government.161
What made the recognition of the Soviet Union so remarkable
was that FDR not only had set the policy of the United States
and entered into an international agreement on his own, but the
government used that unilateral agreement to set aside state
property and contract rules previously considered sacrosanct—all
without any action of Congress or the Senate.
Property owners resisted. Augustus Belmont, a New York
City banker, refused to turn over deposits held on behalf of the
Petrograd Metal Works after the nationalization of all Russian
corporations in 1918.162 FDR’s executive agreement with the
Soviets required that legal ownership of the profits transferred to
the United States government. Belmont’s estate refused to turn
the money over because, it claimed, the property law of New York
state protected it.163
In United States v. Belmont, the Supreme Court again sided
with the executive. It found that the recognition of the USSR, the
international agreement, and the pre-emption of state law all fell
within the president’s constitutional powers to the exclusion of
the states.164 “In respect of all international negotiations and
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state
Id. at 319–20.
Id. at 320.
See United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 326 (1937).
161 Id.
162 Id. at 326.
163 Id. at 326–27; see also Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution: Executive
Expediency and Executive Agreements, 86 C AL. L. R EV. 671, 693 (1998); Michael
D. Ramsey, Executive Agreements and the (Non)Treaty Power, 77 N.C. L. R EV. 133,
146 (1998).
164 Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330.
158
159
160
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lines disappear. As to such purposes the State of New York does
not exist.”165 Presidents since have used this power to make
literally thousands of international agreements with other
countries without the Senate’s advice and consent—from 1939
to 1989, the United States entered into 11,698 executive
agreements and only 702 treaties.166 The courts have
upheld sole executive agreements several times since, including
an agreement ending the Iranian hostage crisis and another
pre-empting the state law claims of Holocaust survivors against
German companies.167
The Supreme Court did not grant the president these powers
in foreign affairs; only the Constitution could do that. Presidents
from Washington onward had interpreted the Constitution’s
vesting of the executive and Commander-in-Chief authorities to
give them the initiative to protect the national security, set
foreign policy, and negotiate with other nations. Sutherland’s
opinions gave judicial recognition to decades of presidential
practice; what had been the product of presidential enterprise
and congressional acquiescence became formal constitutional
law. Roosevelt would draw on these authorities as he
maneuvered to send aid to the Allies and bring the United States
into the war against the fascist powers.
Facing existential threats in the combination of a looming
global conflict and domestic isolationism, FDR drew deeply from
his well of presidential powers. As early as 1935, Roosevelt had
concluded that Hitler’s Germany posed a threat to the United
States.168 As the Axis powers increased the size, strength, and
quality of their militaries while launching offensives against
their neighbors, the President became convinced that military
force would be necessary to protect American interests.
Neutrality offered a false promise of safety. FDR’s approach
represented something of a revolution in American strategic
thought. No longer would American national security depend on
the safety provided by two oceans and control of the Western
Hemisphere, where it had felt no reluctance to launch wars of its
own.169 A German defeat of Great Britain would remove a
valuable buffer that had prevented European nations from naval
Id. at 331.
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 106TH CONG., TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS: THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE, S. PRT. 106–71, at 39 (2001).
167 Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 672–74 (1981); American Ins.
Assoc. v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414–15 (2003).
168 DALLEK, supra note 142, at 102–03.
169 See, e.g., ROBERT KAGAN, DANGEROUS NATION: AMERICA’S FOREIGN POLICY FROM
ITS EARLIEST DAYS TO THE DAWN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 3 (2007); JOHN LEWIS
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and air access to the Americas. And if Hitler succeeded in gaining
complete control of the resources of the European continent,
Germany would become a superpower with the means to
threaten the United States.170 A central objective of American
strategy was to maintain a balance of power in Europe and Asia
to contain expansionist Germany and Japan, but if war came,
FDR and his advisors identified Hitler as the primary threat.171
By December 1940, FDR could be relatively open with the
public about his broader goals. In his famous “Arsenal of
Democracy” speech, he accused the fascist powers of conquering
Europe as a prelude to larger aims that threatened the United
States. Never since “Jamestown and Plymouth Rock has our
American civilization been in such danger as now,” FDR
warned.172 “The Nazi masters of Germany have made it clear
that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in their
own country,” FDR told the nation by radio, “but also to enslave
the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources of Europe to
dominate the rest of the world.”173 He rejected the idea that the
“broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific” would protect
the United States.174 It was only the British navy that protected
the oceans from the Nazis. The United States had to begin
massive rearmament and provide arms and assistance to the free
nations that were bearing the brunt of the fighting. FDR did not
tell the public that he was already taking action to bring the
nation closer to war, first against Europe to stop Hitler, while
holding off Japanese expansion in Asia.
FDR’s strategic vision required several elements to succeed.
The United States had to send military and financial aid to
Britain and France, help those supplies cross the Atlantic Ocean,
and build up the United States military (especially the Navy and
Army Air Corps). If the Allies’ fortunes fell far enough, the nation
would have to be prepared to intervene militarily. Resistance to
these steps was widespread. Many Americans believed that
President Wilson had erred in entering World War I; they
wanted to avoid American involvement in another internecine
squabble in Europe. Between 1939 and 1941, a majority of
Americans grew to support aid to the Allies, but that was as far
as they would go. As late as May 1941, almost eighty percent of
TRACHTENBERG, supra note 144, at 118.
Id. at 118–19.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Fireside Chat 16: On the “Arsenal of Democracy,” MILLER
CENTER UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA (Dec. 29, 1940), https://millercenter.org/thepresidency/presidential-speeches/december-29-1940-fireside-chat-16-arsenal-democracy
[http://perma.cc/U3JM-3JGJ].
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the public wanted the United States to stay out of the conflict.175
Seventy percent felt that FDR had gone too far or had helped
Britain enough.176 Isolationists blamed American entry into
World War I on President Wilson’s use of his executive powers to
tilt American neutrality toward Britain and France.177 Worried
about a re-run, they pressed for strict limitations on presidential
power to keep the United States out of the European war.178
Opposition to American intervention took more concrete
form than public opinion polls. Congress enacted Neutrality Acts
in 1935, 1936, 1937, and 1939 to prevent the United States from
aiding either side. Congress passed the 1935 Act after Germany
repudiated the disarmament requirements of the Treaty of
Versailles and Italy threatened to invade Ethiopia in defiance of
the League of Nations. It required the president to proclaim,
after the outbreak of war between two or more nations, an
embargo of all arms, ammunition or “implements of war” against
the belligerents.179 It gave FDR the authority to decide when to
terminate the embargo, but it left him little choice as to when to
begin one.
The Act prohibited the United States from helping a victim
nation and punishing the aggressor, instead requiring a complete
cut-off for both. FDR had privately opposed the law’s mandatory
terms, fought to keep his discretionary control over foreign
affairs, and in signing the bill predicted that its “inflexible
provisions might drag us into war instead of keeping us out.”180
Later acts prohibited the extension of loans or financial
assistance to belligerents,181 extended the embargo to civil
wars,182 and allowed the ban to cover only arms and munitions,
but not raw materials. In 1939, Congress enacted an even
tougher prohibition that sought to prevent belligerents from
“cash-and-carry” transactions for raw materials by prohibiting
American vessels from transporting anything to nations at war.
Domestic resistance required FDR to adopt an approach that
gave the appearance that the United States was being dragged
into the war. By 1941, with Hitler in control of Europe and Japan
DALLEK, supra note 142, at 267.
Id.
177 Id. at 109.
178 Id.
179 Neutrality Act of 1935, ch. 837, 49 Stat. 1081 (repealed by Lend–Lease Act of
1941, Ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31, 33).
180 DALLEK, supra note 142, at 110.
181 Neutrality Act of 1936, ch. 106, 49 Stat. 1152 (repealed by Lend–Lease Act of
1941, Ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31, 33).
182 Neutrality Act of 1937, ch. 146, 50 Stat. 121 (repealed by Lend–Lease Act of 1941,
Ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31, 33).
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occupying large parts of China, FDR wanted to find a way for the
United States to enter the war on the side of Britain. In August
1941, for example, FDR told Prime Minister Winston Churchill
that he could not rely on Congress to declare war against
Germany.183 Instead, FDR “would wage war, but not declare
it.”184 According to Churchill’s account of their conversation at
the Atlantic Conference, FDR said “he would become more and
more provocative” and promised that “everything would be
done to force an incident” that would “justify him in
opening hostilities.”185
Roosevelt’s plans to move the United States toward war
depended in part on Congress. The Constitution gives Congress
control over international and domestic interstate commerce, as
well as the money and property of the United States. FDR could
lay little claim to constitutional authority to dictate arms-export
policies or to provide financial and material aid to the Allies.
FDR initially hoped that the United States could provide enough
assistance to Britain and France—the United States would prove
the “great Arsenal of Democracy,”186 in his famous words—to
postpone the need for American military intervention in Europe.
After the fall of France, FDR realized that Great Britain could
not hold off the Nazis on its own, but he hoped to send enough
aid to keep Britain alive while he prepared the American public
for war.
FDR pressed Congress for several changes to the Neutrality
Acts that would send more help to the Allies. In the 1936 and
1937 Acts, for example, the administration won more
presidential discretion to determine when a foreign war had
broken out.187 By 1939, it succeeded in changing the law to allow
the president to put off a proclamation of neutrality if necessary
to protect American peace and security.188 This effectively
allowed Britain and France, which controlled the sea routes to
the Americas, to continue to receive aid.
FDR used this flexibility to continue supplying arms and
money to China by declining to find a war to exist there, even

DALLEK, supra note 142, at 285.
Id.
Id.
186 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Great Arsenal of Democracy, AMERICAN
R HETORIC , http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/fdrarsenalofdemocracy.html
[http://perma.cc/6Z6S-RLAF] (last updated Mar. 15, 2017).
187 See Neutrality Act of 1936, ch. 106, 49 Stat. 1152 (repealed by Lend–Lease Act of
1941, Ch. 11, 55 Stat. 31, 33); Neutrality Act of 1937.
188 Neutrality Act of 1939, ch. 2, 54 Stat. 4 (repealed by Lend-Lease Act of 1941, Ch.
11, 55 Stat. 31, 33).
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after Japan had attacked Beijing and Nanjing.189 Similarly,
Roosevelt refused to invoke the Neutrality Acts when Germany
invaded Czechoslovakia in 1939, or Russia in 1941, because a
blanket embargo would have prevented American aid from
flowing to the Allies.190 Manipulating the embargo rules to
affirmatively support one side of various conflicts, FDR showed
little respect for the spirit of the Neutrality Acts. But Congress
would not allow him to go farther. FDR’s proposals throughout
1939 and 1940 to reform the Neutrality Acts to allow for direct
military aid to the Allies repeatedly failed.
As his efforts to modify the Neutrality Acts flagged, FDR
became more aggressive in invoking his inherent constitutional
authority. He asked Attorney General Robert Jackson, “How far
do you think I can go in ignoring the existing act—even though I
did sign it?”191 Vice President John Nance Garner and Secretary
of the Interior Harold Ickes argued that the President’s
constitutional authority in foreign affairs allowed him to act
beyond the Acts.192 Instead of overriding them, however,
Roosevelt simply became more creative in interpreting them. On
May 22, 1940, as German armies swept through France, FDR
ordered the sale of World War I-era equipment to the Allies; on
June 3rd, he ordered the transfer of $38 million in weapons to
U.S. Steel, which promptly sold them at no profit to the British
and French.193 The administration argued that these sales did
not violate the Neutrality Acts because the arms were
“surplus.”194 Three days later (just after the British had
evacuated 300,000 soldiers from the German noose around
Dunkirk), the Navy sold fifty Hell Diver bombers, which had
been introduced to service only in 1938, to Britain because they
were “temporarily in excess of requirements.”195 The sales
occurred at a time when the United States army could field only
80,000 combat troops in five divisions, while the German army in
western Europe deployed two million men in 140 divisions.196 The
U.S. Army Air Corps had only 160 fighter planes and fifty-two
heavy bombers.197 Announcing the decision on June 8th, FDR
told a news conference that “a plane can get out of date darned

189 Aaron X. Fellmeth, A Divorce Waiting to Happen: Franklin Roosevelt and the Law
of Neutrality, 1935–1941, 3 BUFF. J. INT’L L. 414, 451 (1996–97).
190 Id. at 457–59.
191 DALLEK, supra note 142, at 190.
192 Id.
193 Id. at 222, 227.
194 Id. at 222–23.
195 Fellmeth, supra note 189, at 464.
196 DALLEK, supra note 142, at 221.
197 Id. at 222.
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fast.”198 Two days later, in a speech at the University of Virginia,
FDR declared isolationism an “obvious delusion” and called for
an allied victory over “the gods of force and hate” to prevent a
world run by totalitarian governments.199
American aid came too little, too late; France requested an
armistice on June 17, 1940.200 In the midst of a presidential
campaign for an unprecedented third term, FDR sought
bipartisan support for his policies and replaced isolationists in
his cabinet with two internationalist Republicans: Henry
Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as Secretary of the
Navy.201 Both favored repealing the neutrality laws, boosting the
U.S. military through a draft, and sending large amounts of aid
to Great Britain.202 Britain’s destroyer fleet, which had suffered
almost fifty percent losses, needed reinforcements to block a
German invasion force and safeguard its trade lifelines.203
Churchill wrote to Roosevelt that acquiring American destroyers
was “a matter of life and death.”204 FDR reacted by planning to
send two-dozen PT-boats immediately, and said that Navy
lawyers who thought the sale illegal should follow orders or go on
vacation.205 After word of FDR’s plans leaked, Congress enacted a
law forbidding the sale of any military equipment “essential to
the defense of the United States” as certified by the Chief
of Naval Operations or the Army Chief of Staff, and reasserted
a World War I ban on sending any “vessel of war” to
a belligerent.206
Congress’s tightening of neutrality delayed FDR for two
months. While the Battle of Britain raged in the skies, Churchill
begged FDR for additional destroyers. “The whole fate of the
war,” the Prime Minister wrote in July, “may be decided by this
minor and easily remediable factor,” and he urged that “this is
the thing to do now.”207 FDR and his advisors planned a transfer
to Britain of fifty World War I destroyers declared to be
“surplus,” even though similar warships from the same era were
Id.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Address at University of Virginia (June 10, 1940), in THE
PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 259, 261–62 (MacMillan
ed., 1941).
200 DALLEK, supra note 142, at 232.
201 Id.
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203 Id. at 243.
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205 Fellmeth, supra, note 189, at 467–68.
206 Act of June 28, 1940, § 14, 54 Stat. 676, 681 (requiring additional approval prior to
sale of military equipment); Espionage Act of 1917, ch. 30, 40 Stat. 222 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
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being activated for Navy service.208 In exchange, Britain would
provide basing rights in its Western Hemisphere territories to
the United States. In August, the President concluded an
executive agreement with Britain, kept secret at first and
without congressional approval, to make the trade.209
FDR’s advisors divided over the deal’s legality. One legal
advisor believed it violated the June 28th statute and the
Espionage Act of 1917, which forbade sending an armed vessel to
any belligerent while the United States remained neutral; State
Department and Justice Department lawyers agreed.210 But
Dean Acheson, then Undersecretary of the Treasury, argued that
the June 28th law implicitly recognized the president’s
constitutional power to transfer any military asset in order to
improve national security, while others recommended that the
government first sell the destroyers to private companies that
could then resell them to the British.211 Acheson even went
further. He argued that the 1917 law applied only to ships that
were built specifically on order for a belligerent and not to
existing ships originally built or used for the Navy.212
Attorney General Jackson drew on these ideas in his legal
opinion blessing the deal, but also relied on the president’s
Commander-in-Chief power. “Happily there has been little
occasion in our history for the interpretation of the powers of the
President as Commander-in-Chief,” Jackson wrote to FDR.213 “I
do not find it necessary to rest upon that power alone.”214
Nevertheless, “it will hardly be open to controversy that the
vesting of such a function in the President also places upon him a
responsibility to use all constitutional authority which he may
possess to provide adequate bases and stations” for the most
effective use of the armed forces.215 The perilous circumstances
facing the United States reinforced the Commander-in-Chief’s
power. “It seems equally beyond doubt that present world
conditions forbid him to risk any delay that is constitutionally
avoidable.”216 Any statutory effort by Congress to prevent the

Id. at 222.
Id. at 245.
210 Fellmeth, supra note 189, at 473.
211 Id. at 475–77.
212 Id.
213 Opinion on Exchange for Over-Age Destroyers, 39 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 484 (1940),
reprinted in H. JEFFERSON POWELL ED., THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS GENERAL
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president from transferring military equipment to help American
national security would be of “questionable constitutionality.”217
Jackson defended the exclusion of Congress. He thought that
the deal could take the form of an executive agreement because it
required neither the appropriation of funds nor an obligation to
act in the future.218 Justice Sutherland’s opinion in CurtissWright, which the Attorney General extensively quoted,
supported the argument.219 Jackson had a more difficult time
with the Neutrality Acts. He read the June 28th law to recognize
the president’s authority to transfer naval vessels to Britain,
subject only to the requirement that they be surplus or obsolete.
It did not prohibit the transfer of property “merely because it is
still used or usable or of possible value for future use,” but only if
the transfer weakened the national defense.220 The “over-age”
destroyers, as he called them, could be found to fall outside the
statute and hence within the president’s authority, which must
have derived from the Commander-in-Chief power, to exchange
them for valuable military bases.221 Jackson, however, advised
that transferring brand-new mosquito boats would violate
Congress’s ban on sending ships to a belligerent.
Jackson issued an even broader reading of the Commanderin-Chief power in May 1941, when FDR allowed British pilots to
train in American military schools. Under the Commander-inChief power, the president “has supreme command over the land
and naval forces of the country and may order them to perform
such military duties as, in his opinion, are necessary or
appropriate for the defense of the United States.”222 The
president could “command and direct the armed forces in their
immediate movements and operations” and “dispose of troops
and equipment” to promote the national security.223 Jackson read
the passage of Lend-Lease as support for FDR’s judgment that
helping Britain was important to the national defense.224 If the
president had full constitutional authority to use the armed
forces, even to use military force, to protect the nation by helping
Britain, then he must also have the lesser power to train British
airmen. “I have no doubt of the President’s lawful authority to
Id.
Id.
See id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Training of British Flying Students in the United States, 40 OP. ATT’Y GEN. 58
(1941), reprinted in H. JEFFERSON POWELL ED., THE CONSTITUTION AND THE ATTORNEYS
GENERAL 316–17 (1999).
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utilize forces under his command to instruct others in matters of
defense which are vital to the security of the United States.”225 It
“would be anomalous indeed,” Jackson observed, if the military
could provide Britain with arms but could not train the British
how to use them.226
Reaction to the destroyers-for-bases deal, announced in early
August, attacked FDR’s methods more than his goals. Roosevelt
worried that his energetic use of executive power would feed
fears that he was becoming an autocrat, worries punctuated by
his nomination that summer for an unprecedented third term as
president. Leaks of secret Anglo-American staff talks and
announcement of a joint U.S.–Canadian defense board already
had isolationists attacking FDR for pushing the United States
towards war.227 FDR predicted that revelation of the executive
agreement would “raise hell with Congress” and lead to
accusations he was a “warmonger” and “dictator,” and might
torpedo his re-election hopes.228
FDR’s first two predictions quickly came true. His
Republican opponent, Wendell Willkie, supported the policy but
declared that FDR’s unilateral action was “the most dictatorial
and arbitrary act of any president in the history of the United
States.”229 Edwin Borchard, a Yale professor of international law,
argued that Roosevelt had assumed dictatorial powers, placed
himself above the law, and threatened to “break down
constitutional safeguards.”230 The Constitution, Borchard wrote,
“does not give the President carte blanche to do anything he
pleases in foreign affairs.”231 The nation’s leading scholar of
constitutional law, Edward Corwin of Princeton, attacked
Jackson’s opinion as “an endorsement of unrestrained autocracy
in the field of our foreign relations, neither more nor less.”232 In
The New York Times, Corwin asked “why may not any and all of
Congress’s specifically delegated powers be set aside by the
President’s ‘executive power’ and the country be put on a
totalitarian basis without further ado?”233

Id.
Id.
227 DALLEK, supra note 142, at 245.
228 Id.
229 KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: INTO THE STORM 1937–1940, at 611 (1993).
230 Edwin Borchard, The Attorney General’s Opinion on the Exchange of Destroyers for
Naval Bases, 34 AM. J. INT’L L. 690, 691 (1940).
231 Id.
232 Edward S. Corwin, Executive Authority Held Exceeded in Destroyer Deal, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 13, 1940).
233 Id.
225
226

Do Not Delete

248

3/5/18 1:46 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

Despite these ringing attacks on presidential power, the
destroyers-for-bases deal proved remarkably popular—Gallup
polls showed sixty-two percent in favor—encouraging even bolder
steps.234 By October 1940, FDR asked for and received
appropriations of $17.7 billion for national defense—his
administration’s original estimate for the year had been $1.84
billion—and defense spending doubled the following year.235 In
June 1940, he called for the first peacetime draft in American
history, which Congress enacted in September only after Willkie
publicly agreed. A Wall Street lawyer and former Democrat,
Willkie was a dark-horse candidate who had won the nomination
without ever having occupied public office. His attacks on the
New Deal had gained little traction during the campaign, so
Willkie pivoted, painting FDR as a “warmonger” and dictator
who had made “secret agreements” to enter a war that would kill
thousands of young Americans. “If [Roosevelt’s] promise to keep
our boys out of foreign wars is no better than his promise to
balance the budget,” Willkie said on the stump, “they’re already
almost on the transports.”236 By the end of October, Willkie came
within four points of the President, and Roosevelt went on a
speaking tour to reassure mothers in a speech at Boston Garden
on October 30, 1940, that “[y]our boys are not going to be
sent into any foreign wars.”237 Though the polls showed the
election close, FDR prevailed by twenty-seven million to Willkie’s
twenty-two million and an Electoral College majority of 449–82.
After the election, FDR redoubled his efforts to send aid to
Britain. He authorized secret staff talks between American and
British military planners, who recommended a grand strategy of
defeating Germany first while holding Japan to a stalemate.238 In
November, FDR ordered the army to make B-17 bombers
immediately available to the British, to be replaced by British
planes on order in American factories, and he discussed making
half of all American arms production available to the British.
British finances collapsed in late November; the country could no
longer pay for the material it needed to continue the war.
Britain’s ambassador to the United States, Lord Lothian,
appealed to the American public on November 23rd by saying to
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a group of journalists, “[w]ell, boys, Britain’s broke; it’s your
money we want.”239
Lothian’s report of Britain’s functional bankruptcy shocked
the White House into action. FDR approved the sale of $2.1
billion in weapons that the British could not pay for, as well as
the diversion of $700 million in Reconstruction Finance
Corporation funds to underwrite the factory expansions needed
for the increased arms sales.240 The President hit upon one of his
most artful evasions of neutrality, Lend-Lease, which would “get
away from the dollar sign,” as he told reporters at a December
17, 1940, press conference.241 The United States would “lend”
Britain weapons and munitions and, rather than demand
immediate payment, would expect their return after the war’s
end. Of course, the idea was a complete fiction; war would
consume the arms. Ever canny in his presentations to the public,
FDR deployed a homey analogy: If a house were on fire, a
neighbor would lend a garden hose with the expectation that it
would be returned later, rather than demanding $15 for the cost
of the hose.242
Lend-Lease required congressional action. In his famous
“Arsenal of Democracy” speech on December 29th, Roosevelt
defended Lend-Lease and broader aid to the allies with his most
stirring language.243 FDR declared that the Nazis posed the most
direct threat to the security of the United States since its
founding.244 To avoid war, the United States would have to
become the great “arsenal of democracy” for the free nations
carrying on the fight.245 The United States would be less likely to
get into war “if we do all we can now to support the nations
defending themselves against attack by the Axis,” rather than “if
we acquiesce in their defeat.”246
Disclaiming any intention to send a new “American
Expeditionary Force” outside the United States, FDR declared
that “the people of Europe who are defending themselves do not
ask us to do their fighting.”247 All they sought were “the
KENNETH S. DAVIS, FDR: THE WAR PRESIDENT, 1940–1943, at 63 (2000).
Id. at 65.
241 See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Seven Hundred and Second Press Conference
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implements of war.”248 Increasing national defense production
and sending it to Britain would “keep war away from our country
and our people.”249 It was one of the most popular speeches of
FDR’s presidency: roughly eighty percent of the public agreed.250
Congress waited until March 1941 to give its approval to
Lend-Lease,251 but FDR decided to move forward during that
critical time anyway. He authorized British purchase of 23,000
airplanes in November 1940, and rifles and ammunition in
February 1941. He ordered the U.S. military to purchase
munitions factories but diverted the production to Britain.252
In spring 1941, FDR turned to the protection of the supplies
that would begin to flow across the Atlantic, and took unilateral
action that provoked the Nazis and drew the United States ever
closer to war. In March, FDR moved to place Greenland under
American military protection, and in April he gave orders to the
Navy to extend its security zone as far as Greenland and the
Azores, and to begin locating German submarines and reporting
their positions to the Royal Navy. In May, he transferred
one-quarter of the Pacific fleet to the Atlantic to deter any
German effort to seize Atlantic islands for bases. He declared an
“unlimited national emergency” at the end of the month and told
the nation that helping Britain win the battle of the Atlantic was
critical to keeping the Nazis out of the Western Hemisphere.253
“[I]t would be suicide to wait until they are in our front yard,”
Roosevelt argued.254 He followed his speech with a June
deployment of a Marine brigade to occupy Iceland (which is about
1200 miles from London and 2800 miles from Washington, D.C.),
which freed up a British division and extended the American
security zone even further. In July, he announced that the
Navy would begin escorting ships between the United States
and Iceland.
FDR did not seek or receive congressional approval for any of
these deployments, which made clear, if earlier aid had not, that
the United States was no longer a true neutral. Still, Congress
retained ample checks on presidential power. FDR could send
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only 4000 Marines to Iceland because of the small size of the
regular armed forces, and he could not send any of the new
draftees because Congress had attached a provision to the
conscription act forbidding their deployment outside the Western
Hemisphere.255 Congress had also limited the terms of service of
the 900,000 draftees to one year, requiring FDR to go to Congress
to win an extension.256 Even with America occupying Iceland and
Greenland and escorting ships in the North Atlantic, only fifty-one
percent of Americans supported the draft extension, and Congress
narrowly approved it.257
Meanwhile, FDR pursued measures to check Japan’s
expansion and perhaps provoke it into a conflict. Japan had been
waging war in China since the 1931 Manchuria crisis and had
launched an invasion to conquer the whole nation in 1937.
Japanese military and civilian leaders sought to create a
“Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere” that would supply the
raw materials for the Japanese economy and the war in China.258
In 1940, Japan had intensified its attacks in China and had
moved into Indochina. In September 1940, it entered into the
Axis agreement with Germany and Italy.259
Roosevelt launched a campaign of economic warfare, without
reliance on legal authority. In July 1940, for example, FDR
blocked aviation gasoline exports to Japan.260 Chiang Kai-shek
had sent an urgent message to Roosevelt that without more aid,
the Nationalist Chinese resistance to Japan would fail.261 FDR
responded by banning the export of iron and steel to Japan. In
November, he sent $100 million and 100 warplanes to the
Chinese Nationalist government, and in the Spring he authorized
volunteers—Colonel Chennault’s Flying Tigers—to fly fighters
for China.262 FDR had never found China and Japan to be at war
under the 1939 Neutrality Act, so he had no statutory authority
to impose the materials embargo on Japan or to send money and
arms to China.263 Roosevelt simply undertook the actions as
president in order to protect the national security.

See DALLEK, supra note 142, at 276.
Id. at 277.
Id. at 275–77.
258 See, e.g., William L. Swan, Japan’s Intentions for Its Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere as Indicated in Its Policy Plans for Thailand, in 27 JOURNAL OF
SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUDIES 139–49 (Mar. 1996); JOHN TOLAND, THE RISING SUN: THE
DECLINE AND FALL OF THE JAPANESE EMPIRE, 1936–1945, at 447 (1970).
259 See DALLEK, supra note 142, at 277.
260 See Fellmeth, supra note 189, at 466.
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Japan’s expansion south toward Indochina and Thailand
increased the potential for conflict. On July 26, 1941, FDR
ordered a freeze of Japanese assets in the United States, reduced
U.S. oil exports to pre-war levels, and prohibited the sale
of high-octane aircraft gasoline to Japan.264 By mistake,
administrators executed a complete oil embargo against Japan,
which FDR did nothing to correct. FDR opened negotiations to
reach a settlement with the Japanese government, though he
knew because of American code-breaking success that Tokyo was,
at the least, considering an attack on American, British, and
Dutch possessions in Asia.
Some historians believe that FDR’s goal was to hold off
Japan while resources could be devoted against the dire
challenge in Europe—a view held by many of his military and
civilian advisors. Marc Trachtenberg, however, has convincingly
argued that FDR deliberately painted the Japanese into a
corner.265 In the course of negotiations, Roosevelt demanded that
Tokyo end its war in China in exchange for a resumption of U.S.
oil and steel exports, yet FDR and his advisors knew that Japan
would not willingly give up its territorial gains in China. “[T]he
United States had been waging preventive economic warfare
against Imperial Japan for at least 18 months prior to Pearl
Harbor,” Colin Gray writes.266 “U.S. measures of economic
blockade left Japan with no alternative to war consistent with its
sense of national honor. The oil embargo eventually would
literally immobilize the Japanese Navy. So Washington
confronted Tokyo with the unenviable choice between de facto
complete political surrender of its ambitions in China, or war.”267
As FDR squeezed Japan, he expanded political and military
assistance to the British. On August 9th, he met Churchill in
Placentia Bay, off Newfoundland, where the two leaders issued
the Atlantic Charter.268 It declared Anglo-American principles in
the war to be: no Anglo-American aggrandizement, opposition to
undemocratic changes in territory, self-government for all
peoples, equal access to trade and natural resources,
international economic cooperation, a guarantee of security and
See id. at 413.
See TRACHTENBERG, supra note 144, at 80–139.
COLIN S. GRAY, THE IMPLICATIONS OF PREEMPTIVE AND PREVENTIVE WAR
DOCTRINES: A RECONSIDERATION 23 (2007), https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/
PUB789.pdf [http://perma.cc/436B-SSS6].
267 Id.; see also Hew Strachan, Preemption and Prevention in Historical Perspective,
in PREEMPTION: MILITARY ACTION AND MORAL JUSTIFICATION 23 (Henry Shue & David
Rodin eds., 2007) (“For Japan itself the choices by 1941 seemed to be economic
strangulation and geopolitical imprisonment on the one hand, or war on the other.”).
268 See DALLEK, supra note 142, at 281.
264
265
266
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freedom to all nations, freedom of the seas, disarmament of
aggressors and reduction in armaments, and plans for a
collective system of international security.269 During the
discussions, FDR made clear to Churchill his desire to bring the
United States into the war by forcing an incident with
Germany,270 and set out to make his wish come true by ordering
full naval escorts for British convoys between the United States
and Iceland, which put the Germans in the position of either
firing on U.S. warships or conceding the Battle of the Atlantic.
Without input from Congress, FDR had joined together the fates
of the United States and Britain.
An undeclared shooting war soon broke out. On September
4th, a German submarine fired on the destroyer USS Greer,
which FDR used to publicly justify “shoot-on-sight” orders for
naval escorts in the Atlantic.271 Only later did Congress learn
that the Greer had been hunting the submarine with British
airplanes and had dropped depth charges on the Germans. FDR
declared the Nazis to be the equivalent of modern-day pirates
and compared German subs and commerce raiders to
“rattlesnakes of the Atlantic.”272 As he put it, “when you see a
rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has struck
before you crush him.”273
FDR won broad support for the Navy’s new rules of
engagement in the Atlantic, but at the price of deliberately
deceiving the public about the facts.274 He followed with an
October speech claiming that captured Nazi plans envisioned the
division of North and South America into five dependent states
and the abolition of the freedom of religion.275 The shooting war
led to German submarine attacks on two American destroyers,
the USS Kearny and the USS Reuben James, with the deaths of
eleven and 115 sailors, respectively.276 FDR responded by seeking
amendment of the neutrality laws to allow merchantmen to arm
and carry goods directly to British ports.
269 See Franklin Delano Roosevelt, The Atlantic Charter (Aug. 14, 1941), in 10 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 314 (Samuel I. Rosenman
ed., 1950).
270 See DALLEK, supra note 142, at 285.
271 Id. at 287.
272 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Fireside Chat to the Nation (Sept. 11, 1941), in 10 THE
PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 384, 390 (Samuel I.
Rosenman ed., 1950).
273 Id.
274 See DALLEK, supra note 142, at 288–89.
275 See FRANKLIN DELANO ROOSEVELT, Navy and Total Defense Day Address (Oct. 27,
1941), in 10 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 438,
439 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).
276 See DALLEK, supra note 142, at 291.
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The changes passed Congress by small majorities because
about seventy percent of the public told pollsters they opposed
American entry into the war.277 FDR concluded that the public,
influenced by the memory of the way Wilson had led the country
into World War I, would not rally behind a war waged in
response to these isolated incidents. Rising tensions with Japan,
however, provided other opportunities. After the Atlantic
Conference, FDR informed the Japanese ambassador that any
further expansion in Southeast Asia would force him to take any
and all measures necessary “toward insuring the safety and
security of the United States.”278 FDR’s attempts at a negotiated
solution were, perhaps, less than genuine. He offered to
undertake formal negotiations with Prince Konoye, the Japanese
Prime Minister, only if Japan suspended its “expansionist
activities” and openly declared its intentions in the Pacific.279
FDR asked that Japan terminate the Axis alliance, withdraw
from China, and open up its trading system. He consciously
demanded terms he knew that the Japanese were unlikely
to accept.
Japanese cabinet meetings on September 3rd through 6th
concluded that unless the government reached a settlement with
the United States by October, its military would attack
American, British, and Dutch possessions in Asia.280 Tokyo
decided its terms must include the freedom to conclude matters
in China, an end to Anglo-American military action in the
Pacific, and secure access to raw materials for the economy. FDR
refused to negotiate on these conditions and instead ordered the
reinforcement of the Philippines. By October 15th, FDR and his
advisors believed that they needed more “diplomatic fencing” to
create the image “that Japan was put into the wrong and made
the first bad move—overt move.”281
Thanks to electronic intercepts of Japanese communications,
FDR knew that the Japanese would attack if no settlement were
reached, and he tried to string out negotiations to give the armed
forces time to strengthen its position in the Philippines. On
November 24, 1941, FDR discussed with his advisors the chances
of a Japanese sneak attack and asked “how we should maneuver
them into the position of firing the first shot without allowing too
much danger to ourselves.”282 He also told the British that he
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would respond to any attack on their possessions in Asia. Still,
FDR realized that without an enemy attack on the United States,
his other measures would not convince the American people to
support entry into World War II.
On December 7, 1941, the Japanese solved FDR’s
conundrum.283 No evidence supports the theories that FDR knew
that Pearl Harbor was the target, nor that he willfully ignored
the possibility of devastating losses to the Pacific Fleet. FDR did
not consciously know about any specific attack on the United
States—rather, he placed the Japanese in the position of
choosing between war and giving up their imperial ambitions in
China and the rest of the Pacific. The most that can be said is
that if war were to come, FDR had tried for more than a year to
maneuver the Axis powers into firing a first shot, while
preparing the armed forces and American public for that
eventuality. Pearl Harbor guaranteed the unity of the American
people, just as Fort Sumter had eight decades before. As FDR
told the American people the next day, December 7th was a “day
which would live in infamy,” and he asked Congress for a
declaration of war, which it promptly granted.284
Hitler further obliged by declaring war on the United States
three days later. FDR exercised foresighted leadership in
recognizing the Axis threat to the United States and the free
nations of the West. But faced with a recalcitrant Congress and a
reluctant public, FDR had to use his constitutional powers to
move the nation into a war that he knew, as perhaps no one else
did, was in the country’s best interests. If he had faithfully
obeyed the Neutrality Acts, American entry into the war might
have been delayed by months, if not years. A president who
viewed his constitutional authorities as narrowed to executing
the will of Congress might well have lost World War II.
III. WARTIME CIVIL LIBERTIES
It is commonplace today to read the argument that war
reduces civil liberties too much. We can gain a useful perspective
on the question by examining Roosevelt’s wartime measures.
FDR responded to the devastating Pearl Harbor attack with
domestic policies, such as the use of military commissions, the
internment of Japanese-Americans, and the widespread use of
electronic surveillance. As in the Civil War, the federal courts
deferred to the political branches until the war ended, and
Congress went along with the president for the most part.
283
284
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A.

Military Commissions
Military commissions are a form of tribunal used to try
captured members of the enemy for violations of the laws of war.
American generals have used them from the Revolutionary War
through World War II, and, as we have seen, the Lincoln
administration deployed them during the Civil War to try
Confederate spies, irregular guerrillas, and sympathizers.
Military commissions are neither created nor regulated by the
Uniform Code of Military Justice, which is enacted by Congress
and governs courts-martial; instead, they were established by
presidents as Commander-in-Chief and by military commanders
in the field.285
World War II witnessed the use of military commissions on a
par with the Civil War, but primarily for the administration of
postwar justice. While the Nuremburg trials were the most well
known, military commissions heard charges of war crimes
against many former German and Japanese leaders at the end of
the war. But the first commission was set up well before those,
more famous examples, to hear the case of “The Nazi Saboteurs.”
In June 1942, eight German agents covertly landed in Long
Island and Florida with plans to attack factories, transportation
facilities, and utility plants.286 All had lived in the United States
before the war, and two were American citizens. One of them
turned informer; after initially dismissing his story, the FBI
arrested the plotters and revealed their capture by the end of
June.287 Members of Congress and the media demanded the
death penalty, even though no statutory provision established
capital punishment for non-U.S. citizens.288
Roosevelt wanted a trial outside the civilian judicial system.
On June 30th, he wrote to his Attorney General, Francis Biddle
(Jackson having been elevated to the Supreme Court), supporting
the idea of using military courts because “[t]he death penalty is
called for by usage and by the extreme gravity of the war aim
and the very existence of our American Government.”289
Roosevelt already thought they were guilty, and the punishment
was not in doubt: “Surely they are just as guilty as it is possible
to be . . . and it seems to me that the death penalty is almost
285 For a critical review of the history, compare JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN
INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON Terror 204–30 (2006), with LOUIS FISHER, MILITARY
TRIBUNALS & PRESIDENTIAL POWER: AMERICAN REVOLUTION TO THE WAR ON TERRORISM
253–56 (2005).
286 See David J. Danelski, The Saboteurs’ Case, 1 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 61, 61 (1996).
287 See id. at 65.
288 Id. at 61–65.
289 Id. at 65.
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obligatory.”290 Two days earlier, Biddle and Secretary of War
Henry Stimson had worried that the plot was not far enough
along to win a conviction with a significant sentence—perhaps
two years at most. Stimson was surprised that Biddle was “quite
ready to turn them over to a military court” and learned
that Justice Felix Frankfurter also believed a military
court preferable.291
On June 30th, Biddle wrote to Roosevelt summarizing the
advantages of a military commission.292 It would be speedier and
easier to prove violations of the laws of war, and the death
penalty would be available. Biddle also believed that using a
military commission would prevent the defendants from seeking
a writ of habeas corpus. “All the prisoners . . . can thus be denied
access to our courts.”293 He did not commit to writing another
important consideration: secrecy. According to Stimson, Biddle
favored a military commission because the evidence would not
become public, particularly that the Nazis had infiltrated U.S.
lines with ease and had been captured only with the help of an
informant.294 Biddle recommended that FDR issue executive
orders establishing the commission, defining the crimes,
appointing its members, and excluding judicial review.295
On July 2, 1942, Roosevelt issued two executive orders.296
The first created the commission and gave it the authority to try
any “subjects, citizens, or residents of any nation at war with the
United States,” who attempt to “enter the United States or any
territory or possession thereof, through coastal or boundary
defenses,” with an effort to “commit sabotage, espionage, hostile
or warlike acts, or violations of the law or war.”297 The
commission would try the defendants for violations of the laws of
war, which mostly took the form of unwritten custom. FDR
prohibited any appeals to the civilian courts, unless the Secretary
of War and the Attorney General consented.298 His second order,
in one paragraph, established the rules of procedure. The
military judges were to hold a “full and fair trial” and could
admit any evidence that would “have probative value to a

290
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reasonable man.”299 The concurrence of two-thirds of the judges
was required for sentencing, and any appeals had to run directly
to the President himself.300
As structured by FDR, the commissions subjected the Nazi
saboteurs to a form of justice very different from that normally
applied in civilian courts. The most striking departure was the
absence of a jury, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to the
Constitution. Neither civilian criminal procedure nor the normal
rules of evidence applied, and FDR made no allowances for a
right to legal counsel, a right to remain silent, or a right of
appeal. Another important difference was that the laws of war,
which at that time remained mostly unwritten, would define the
crimes. Unlike the civilian system, which requires that the
government prosecute defendants for crimes that are clearly
defined and written, the saboteurs would be charged with war
crimes upon which even legal experts would struggle to agree.
FDR’s order was of uncertain constitutionality under the law
of the day. At that time, the governing case was still Ex parte
Milligan. Milligan held that the government had to use civilian
courts when the defendant was not a member of the enemy
armed forces and the courts were “open to hear criminal
accusations and redress grievances.”301 FDR created military
commissions to avoid Milligan, to charge the defendants with
violations of the laws of war, and to preclude any form of judicial
review. Military counsel for the Nazi saboteurs challenged the
constitutionality of the trial on the ground that courts were open,
the defendants were not in a war zone, violations of the laws of
war were not subject to prosecution under federal law. Military
commissions, they argued, violated the Articles of War enacted
by Congress.302
FDR was undeterred when the Supreme Court agreed to
hear the defendants’ case. As the Justices gathered in conference
before oral argument, Justice Roberts reported that Biddle was
worried that FDR would order the execution of the saboteurs
regardless of the Court’s decision. Chief Justice Stone, whose son
was working on the defense team, said “[t]hat would be
a dreadful thing.”303 While Stone did not recuse himself,
Justice Murphy—who was in uniform as a member of the army

299 Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy: Appointment of a Military
Commission, 7 Fed. Reg. 5103 (July 7, 1942).
300 See id.; see also FISHER, supra note 285, at 99–100.
301 Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 121–22 (1866).
302 Danelski, supra note 288, at 68–69.
303 Id. at 69.
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reserve—did.304 Justice Byrnes, who had been serving as an
informal advisor to the administration, did not. Biddle himself
argued the case and urged the Court to overrule Milligan, but
after two days of oral argument, the Justices decided to uphold
the military commission.305 The great pressure on the Court is
reflected in its decision to deliver a brief per curiam opinion the
day after oral argument, with an opinion to follow months later.
Commission proceedings began the day after the Supreme
Court issued its order. The commission convicted and sentenced
the defendants to death in three days.306 Five days later, FDR
approved the verdict but commuted the sentences of two
defendants.307 Roosevelt’s two executive orders remained the only
guidance for the commission on the rules of procedures and the
definition of the substantive crimes. There was no written
explanation, for example, of the elements of the violations of the
laws of war, nor were procedures given, aside from the votes
required for conviction and the admission of evidence.
When the Supreme Court finally issued its opinion, it
carefully distinguished Milligan.308 Chief Justice Stone’s
unanimous opinion for the Court found that Milligan applied to a
civilian who had never associated himself with the enemy.309 The
Nazi saboteurs, by contrast, had clearly joined the German
armed forces. Neither the Bill of Rights nor the separation of
powers barred FDR from using military courts during wartime
to try enemy combatants. Congressional creation of the courts
martial system and the absence of any criminal provisions
to punish violations of the laws of war presented no
serious obstacle. Chief Justice Stone read the Article of War
recognizing the concurrent jurisdiction of military commissions
as congressional blessing for their existence.310 The Justices
decided not to address the issue that had divided them
behind the scenes—whether Congress could require the president
to provide the saboteurs with any trial at all, civilian or
military—because they did not read any congressional enactment
as prohibiting military commissions.311 If the United States was at
war, and it captured members of the enemy armed forces, it could
try the prisoners for war crimes outside the civilian or court
martial systems.
304
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B.

Detention
In the wake of Pearl Harbor, President Roosevelt ordered
sweeping military detentions that, in absolute numbers, far
eclipsed Lincoln’s policies in the Civil War. After the Japanese
attack and the German and Italian declarations of war, FDR
authorized the Departments of War and Justice to intern
German, Japanese, and Italian citizens in the United States. In
February 1942, for example, the government detained
approximately 3000 Japanese aliens.312 Detention of the citizens
of an enemy nation had long been a normal aspect of the rules of
war, and was authorized by the Alien Enemies Act (on the books
since 1798).313 That same month, FDR went even further and
authorized the detention of American citizens suspected of
disloyalty. On February 19, 1942, FDR signed Executive Order
9066, allowing the Secretary of War to designate parts of the
country as military zones “from which any or all persons may be
excluded.”314 By the end of 1942, the government moved 110,000
Japanese-Americans to ten internment camps because of the
possibility that they might provide aid to the enemy.315 Recent
historical work suggests that Roosevelt took a far more
active role in the detention decision than has been
commonly understood.316
There was substantial disagreement within the military and
the administration on the internments.317 General John DeWitt,
commander of the Fourth Army on the West Coast, initially
opposed the mass evacuations of Japanese-Americans, as did
officials in the Justice Department and several prominent White
House aides, but by late January 1942, thinking had changed.318
A popular movement on the West Coast demanded removal of the
Japanese-Americans to the nation’s interior. This sentiment
gathered momentum as the United States suffered a string of
military defeats in the Pacific. The precipitating factor in the
eventual internment decision appears to be the release of the
Roberts Commission report on the Pearl Harbor attacks.319 While
the commission only briefly mentioned that some Japanese in the
312 See PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR: THE HISTORY OF THE JAPANESE AMERICAN
INTERNMENT CASES 19 (1983).
313 See Alien Enemies Act, c. 66, §1, 1 Stat. 577 (July 6, 1978).
314 Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
315 IRONS, supra note 312, at vii.
316 See GREG ROBINSON, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: FDR AND THE INTERNMENT OF
JAPANESE AMERICANS 79, 92–95, 98–99, 104, 106–07, 127 (2003).
317 See, e.g., IRONS, supra note 312, at 29–30, 33–35; ROBINSON, supra note 316, at
76–78, 85–86; ERIK YAMAMOTO ET AL., RACE, RIGHTS & REPARATION: LAW AND THE
JAPANESE AMERICAN INTERNMENT 100 (Richard A. Epstein et al. eds., 2001).
318 See ROBINSON, supra note 316, at 3.
319 Id. at 95.
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Hawaiian Islands, along with Japanese consular officials, had
provided intelligence on military installations before the attacks,
the public response was tremendous. The Roberts Commission
report “attracted national attention and transformed public
opinion on Japanese Americans.”320 Newspapers, California
political leaders, and military officials demanded that the
Roosevelt administration intern Japanese-Americans out of fear
of further sabotage and espionage.321 Some in the War
Department discounted the effect of espionage on the West Coast,
and FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover dismissed claims of disloyalty.
Cabinet members raised the issue twice with the President
before the final executive order. Biddle met FDR for lunch in
early February 1942 to express doubts about the need for
internment. While FDR did not make a decision at that time, he
concluded the lunch by saying he was “fully aware of the dreadful
risk of Fifth Column retaliation in case of a raid.”322 A few days
later, Stimson called Roosevelt after learning that General
DeWitt would recommend removal of Japanese-Americans on the
West Coast.323 News that Singapore had fallen arrived the
day before Stimson’s call, making it unlikely that FDR would
second-guess claims of military necessity. Nonetheless,
Stimson—who had his own doubts about the necessity and
legality of the evacuations—proposed three options: massive
evacuation, evacuation from major cities, or evacuation from
areas surrounding military facilities.324 Roosevelt responded that
Stimson should do what he thought best, and that he would sign
an executive order giving the War Department the authority to
carry out the removals.325 DeWitt soon found the evacuations
necessary on security grounds, and Stimson and Biddle agreed on
a draft of the executive order based on Roosevelt’s constitutional
authorities as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief.326 It
appears that FDR’s decision rested solely on the military’s claim
of wartime necessity.
Several scholars have observed that Roosevelt was not
vigilant in protecting civil liberties, and in this case, according to
one biographer, the decision was easy for him.327 FDR believed
that the military “had primary direct responsibility for the
achievement of war victory, the achievement of war victory had
320
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top priority, and ‘victory’ had for him a single simple meaning” of
defeating Germany and Japan; victory, for Roosevelt, “was
prerequisite to all else.”328 There was no great outcry from liberal
leaders, there was no cabinet meeting or forum for debate within
the administration, and the Attorney General came to agree with
the War Department that the measure was legal. Recent
historical work argues that the internment decision did not arise
solely because of misinformation about Japanese-Americans or
the pressure of events early in the war.329 The internments
happened, in part, because FDR was ready to believe the worst
about the potential disloyalty of Japanese-Americans.330
Presidential consultation with Congress did not improve
national security decision-making. Both Congress and the Court
approved FDR’s actions. In March 1942, Congress passed a bill
establishing criminal penalties for those who refused to obey the
evacuation orders.331 Support for the law was so broad that it was
approved in both the House and Senate by voice vote with only a
single speech, by Republican Senator Robert Taft of Ohio,
in opposition.
The Supreme Court did not directly address the
constitutionality of the detentions until Korematsu v. United
States, decided on December 18, 1944.332 According to the Court,
the mass evacuation triggered “strict” scrutiny under the Equal
Protection Clause because it discriminated on the basis of race.333
Nonetheless, the Court agreed that these wartime security
measures advanced a compelling government interest, and the
Court deferred to the military’s judgment of necessity. According
to Justice Black’s 6–3 majority opinion, “[the court was] unable to
conclude that it was beyond the war power of Congress and the
Executive to exclude those of Japanese ancestry from the West
Coast war area at the time they did.”334 While not disputing the
deprivation of individual liberty involved, the majority
recognized that “the military authorities, charged with the
primary responsibility of defending our shores, concluded that
curfew provided inadequate protection and ordered exclusion.”335
As with an earlier case upholding a nighttime curfew on
Japanese-Americans in the western military region, the Court
concluded, “we cannot reject as unfounded the judgment of the
328
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military authorities and of Congress that there were disloyal
members of that population, whose number and strength could
not be precisely and quickly ascertained.”336
The Court’s majority stressed that the Constitution afforded
leeway to the executive branch during time of emergency.337
Justice Black agreed that while the government generally could
not detain citizens based solely on their race, such motivation
was not present in the instant case. The exclusion order was
necessary, Black wrote, because “the properly constituted
military authorities feared an invasion of our West Coast,” and
their judgment was that “the military urgency of the situation
demanded that all citizens of Japanese ancestry be segregated
from the West Coast temporarily[.]”338 Although it observed that
Congress supported the military’s power “as inevitably it must”
during wartime, the Court attached no special importance to
the authorization.339
The press of circumstances required deference to military
judgment. “There was evidence of disloyalty on the part of some,
the military authorities considered that the need for action was
great, and time was short.”340 Perhaps most important, Justice
Black concluded that decisions taken during the emergency itself
had to be understood in light of the information known at the
time. “We cannot—by availing ourselves of the calm perspective
of hindsight—now say that at that time these actions
were unjustified.”341
Korematsu remains one of the most criticized decisions in
American history, considered second only to Dred Scott on the list
of the Court’s biggest mistakes. The three dissenters believed
that the Constitution clearly protected Japanese-American
citizens from what we today would call racial profiling. The
government, Justice Roberts wrote, was “convicting a citizen as a
punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a
concentration camp, based on his ancestry, and solely because of
his ancestry, without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty
and good disposition towards the United States.”342 The
dissenters did not challenge the proposition that “sudden danger”
might require the suspension of a citizen’s right to free
movement, or that the Court owed the military broad deference

336
337
338
339
340
341
342

Id. (quoting Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 99 (1943)).
Id. at 220.
Id. at 223.
Id.
Id. at 223–24.
Id.
Id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

Do Not Delete

264

3/5/18 1:46 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

during wartime, but that the chosen hypothetical did not
represent the true facts of the case. Any “immediate, imminent,
and impending” threat to public safety was absent.343 Justice
Murphy wrote in dissent that “this forced exclusion was the
result in good measure of [an] erroneous assumption of racial
guilt rather than bona fide military necessity.”344 The dissenters
pointed out that the government presented no reliable evidence
that Japanese-Americans were generally disloyal or had done
anything that made them a threat to the national defense.
The exclusion order relied simply on unproven racial and
sociological stereotypes.
Justice Jackson used his dissent to harmonize the role of the
executive and the courts during wartime. “It would be
impracticable and dangerous idealism to expect or insist that
each specific military command in an area of probable operations
will conform to conventional tests of constitutionality.”345 For a
Commander-in-Chief and the military, “the paramount
consideration is that its measures be successful, rather than
legal.”346 In words that echoed Lincoln and Jefferson, Jackson
declared that the “armed services must protect a society, not
merely its Constitution,” and observed that “defense measures
will not, and often should not, be held within the limits that bind
civil authority in peace.”347 That said, Jackson did not want to
provide constitutional legitimacy to the exclusion order. There
might be no limit to what military necessity would allow when
courts are institutionally incapable of second-guessing the
decisions of military authorities. “But if we cannot confine
military expedients by the Constitution, neither would I distort
the Constitution to approve all that the military may deem
expedient.”348 Upholding the Japanese-American internment
would create a dangerous precedent for the future. “The principle
then lies about like a loaded weapon ready for the hand of any
authority that can bring forward a plausible claim of an urgent
need.”349 A one-time-only action is only an “incident,” but once
upheld by the Court, it becomes “the doctrine of the
Constitution.”350 In a solution many have found unsatisfying,
Jackson wanted the Court neither to bless nor block the
military’s enforcement of the exclusion.
343
344
345
346
347
348
349
350

Id. at 234 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 235–36 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
Id. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
Id. (Jackson, J., dissenting).
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Historical research has revealed that some government
officials doubted whether any real security threat justified the
exclusion order. Nonetheless, the Justice Department chose in
Korematsu to assert that military authorities believed the
evacuations necessary because of an alleged threat against the
West Coast. A companion case, Ex parte Endo, however, found
that the government could not detain a Japanese-American
citizen whom the government had conceded was “loyal and
law-abiding.”351 To this day, the debate over the necessity of the
measures continues, but regardless of which side one falls on in
that debate, it seems clear that the internment of the JapaneseAmericans in Korematsu represents a far more serious
infringement of civil liberties than that which occurred in the
Civil War. The first and most obvious difference is one of
magnitude. FDR interned—without trial—about 110,000
Japanese-Americans on suspicion of disloyalty to the United
States.352 Lincoln ordered the detention of about 12,600.353
The second difference is one of justification. FDR ordered the
detention of the Japanese-Americans not because any had been
found to be enemy combatants. They were interned because of
their potential threat due to loyalty to an enemy nation imputed
from their ethnic ancestry. FDR could have pursued a narrower
policy that detained individuals based on their individual ties to
a nation with which the United States was at war. The citizens of
Japan, Germany, and Italy could be interned as a matter of
course, and anyone fighting or working for the enemy, regardless
of citizenship, could be detained. With regard to aliens, FDR
could have relied upon the Alien Enemies Act to detain natives or
citizens of a hostile nation during wartime.354 FDR’s internment
policy did neither—instead, it presumed disloyalty, sweeping
in 110,000 American’s of Japanese ancestry based solely on
their ethnicity.
C.

Electronic Surveillance
Roosevelt has been described by one historian as
the president most interested in covert activity other than
351 Ex Parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 294 (1944); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323
U.S. 214 (1944), reprinted in PHILLIP B. KURLAND AND GERHARD CASPER, LANDMARK
BRIEFS AND ARGUMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 197 (1975); ROBINSON, supra note 316, at 210.
352 IRONS, supra note 312, at vii.
353 MARK E. NEELY JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL
LIBERTIES 10 (1991).
354 Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, §1, 1 Stat. 577 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 21); see also
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 173 (1948) (upholding the use of the Alien Enemies Act
during World War II in the case of a German national detained in the United States).
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Washington, who personally managed spies and directed the
interception of British communications. During World War I,
Roosevelt had served as assistant secretary of the Navy, with
responsibility for intelligence. During World War II, his
interest in covert operations led to the establishment of the
Office of Strategic Services, the forerunner of the Central
Intelligence Agency.355
Less well known are Roosevelt’s actions with regard to the
interception of electronic communications. The Administration
initially had not engaged in any wiretapping for national
security purposes, as Attorney General Jackson believed that
electronic surveillance without a warrant violated the Federal
Communications Act of 1934.356 In March 1940, he issued
an order prohibiting the FBI from intercepting electronic
communications without a warrant. As Europe plunged into war,
however, J. Edgar Hoover grew increasingly concerned about the
possibility of Axis spies within the United States. Aware of
Jackson’s order, Hoover went to Treasury Secretary Henry
Morgenthau and asked him to speak to Roosevelt to authorize
the interception of the communications of potential foreign
agents who might sympathize with Germany.357
Roosevelt had long been concerned with the potential threat
of a “fifth column” inside the United States. The spectacular 1916
sabotage of an American munitions plant remained vivid in his
memory. As early as 1936, Roosevelt authorized the FBI to
investigate “subversive activities in this country, including
communism and fascism.”358 When World War II broke out,
Roosevelt ordered the Bureau to “take charge of investigative
work in matters relating to espionage, sabotage, and violations of
neutrality regulations,” and commanded state and local law
enforcement officers to “promptly turn over” to the FBI any
information “relating to espionage, counterespionage, sabotage,
subversive activities and violations of the neutrality laws.”359
What “subversive activities” meant was left undefined.
France’s collapse in May 1940 had a profound effect. At the
time, Germany’s smashing victory seemed inexplicable as a feat
of arms alone, lending credence to the theory that collaborators
355 CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY: SECRET INTELLIGENCE
AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 6–9, 76 (1996).
356 Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
357 See Richard Caplan & Neal Katyal, The Surprisingly Stronger Case for the
Legality of the NSA Surveillance Program: The FDR Precedent, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1023,
1049–50 (2008).
358 ANDREW, supra note 355, at 89.
359 Id. at 91.
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and spies were also responsible. Roosevelt increasingly spoke of
his concern that the United States, too, might suffer from Axis
sympathizers or covert agents’ intent on undermining its war
preparations. Even before Hoover came to make his request, FDR
had encouraged amateur surveillance efforts. His friend,
publisher, and real estate developer, Vincent Astor, had set up a
private group he had called “the Room,” which included leading
figures in New York City.360 As a director of the Western Union
Telegraph Company, Astor ordered the covert interception of
telegrams.361 He and his friends also arranged for the monitoring
of radio transmissions in New York. Using its connections, the
group gathered the private banking records of companies
connected to foreign nations to determine whether they were
supporting espionage within the United States.362 While there is
no direct record of a presidential order authorizing this
surveillance, historical evidence suggests that the group was
acting in response to a request by Roosevelt.363
Given his suspicions, Roosevelt quickly agreed with
Morgenthau and Hoover that the wiretapping of suspected Axis
agents or collaborators was necessary to protect national
security. The next day, he issued a memorandum to Jackson to
allow the FBI to wiretap individuals who posed a potential threat
to the national security.364 After Pearl Harbor, FDR released the
handbrake and authorized the interception of all international
communications. Even though some Justices had criticized
wiretapping, the Court held in 1928 in Olmstead v. United
States, that the Fourth Amendment did not require a warrant to
intercept electronic communications.365 It would not be until
1967, in Katz v. United States, that the Supreme Court would
hold that electronic communications were entitled to Fourth
Amendment privacy protections.366
Congress, however, appeared to have prohibited the
interception of electronic communications in the Federal
Communications Act of 1934. It declared that “no person” who
receives or transmits “any interstate or foreign communication
by wire or radio” can “divulge or publish” its contents except
through “authorized channels of transmission” or to the
recipient.367 In United States v. Nardone, decided in 1937, the
360
361
362
363
364
365
366
367

Id. at 83.
Id.
Id. at 92.
See id.
United States v. U.S. District Court, 444 F.2d 651, 669–70 (6th Cir. 1971).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928).
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 359 (1967).
Communications Act of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1934).
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Supreme Court interpreted this language to prohibit wiretapping
by the government as well as by private individuals.368 In
a second Nardone case, the Court made clear that the
government could not introduce in court any evidence gathered
from wiretapping.369
FDR recognized that his wiretapping order of May 1940
violated the text of the statute, or at least the Supreme Court’s
reading of it, but the President claimed that the Supreme Court
could not have intended “any dictum in the particular case which
it decided to apply to grave matters involving the defense of the
nation.”370 Administration supporters in Congress introduced
legislation to legalize wiretapping, but the House rejected the bill
154–147.371 FDR continued the interception program throughout
the war despite the Federal Communications Act and Nardone.
FDR’s pre-war interception order applied to anyone “suspected of
subversive activities” against the U.S. government, which
included individuals who might be sympathetic to, or even
working for, Germany and Japan.372 At that time, however, the
United States was not yet at war. While FDR wanted the FBI to
limit the interceptions to the calls of aliens, his order did not
exclude citizens. Most importantly, it was not limited only to
international calls or telegrams, but included communications
that took place wholly within the United States.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
War and emergency demand that presidents exercise their
constitutional powers far more broadly than in peacetime. That
was never more true than under President Franklin Roosevelt.
FDR tackled the Great Depression by treating it as a domestic
emergency that called for the centralization of power in the
federal government and the presidency. But he could not act
alone, because the Constitution gives Congress the authority to
regulate the economy and create the federal agencies. Under
Roosevelt’s direction, Congress enacted sweeping legislation
vesting almost complete power over industry and agriculture in
the executive branch, which repeatedly sought to centralize
power over the plethora of New Deal agencies in the presidency.

See United States v. Nardone, 302 U.S. 379, 384 (1937).
Id. at 338.
370 ROBERT H. JACKSON, THAT MAN: AN INSIDER’S PORTRAIT OF FRANKLIN D.
ROOSEVELT 68–69 (2003).
371 See Caplan & Katyal, supra note 357, at 1060.
372 United States v. U.S. District Court, 444 F.2d 651, 670 (6th Cir. 1971).
368
369
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Roosevelt responded to the looming threat of fascism by
bringing the United States into World War II, and he made all
the significant decisions of foreign and domestic policy once the
war began. Historians rarely, if ever, mention any role for
Congress in the prosecution of the war against Germany and
Japan, aside from the provision of money and arms. It was the
President, for example, who decided that the United States
would allocate its resources to seek victory in Europe first, and
Roosevelt alone who declared that the Allies would demand
unconditional surrender as the only way to end the war.
FDR, not Congress, made the critical decisions about the
shape of the postwar world. He wanted a world policed by four
major countries: the United States, Great Britain, China, and the
Soviet Union. He agreed with Great Britain and the Soviet Union
to divide Germany—the “German question” was the fundamental
strategic problem at the root of both World Wars. At Yalta, FDR
agreed that the Soviet Union would control a sphere of influence
extending over Eastern Europe, and in return, those nations
would be allowed to hold democratic elections.
While some believe that Stalin had hoodwinked him, FDR
may have recognized the reality of the balance of power in
Europe after the war. He may have hoped that his
reasonableness in agreeing to Stalin’s demands would win, in
exchange, Soviet support of the United Nations. Roosevelt also
demanded that Britain and France give up their colonies. FDR
wanted to forestall a return to both the isolationism and the
international disorder of the interwar period. Historians argue
today whether Roosevelt truly believed in collective security, or
whether he was a realist who accepted the balance of power at
the end of World War II. Either way, it was the President who
took the initiative to set the policy, although it was one where he
could not act alone. Without the Senate’s approval, the United
Nations would have gone the way of the League of Nations.
Too often, we focus on mistakes of commission—a
decision to go to war gone bad, or a law that has unintended
consequences—known as Type I errors. FDR showed that the
presidency may be far more effective than the other branches in
preventing a failure to take action—errors of omission, or Type II
errors. Left to its own devices, Congress would have blocked aid
to the Allies and delayed American entry into World War II by
several months, if not years. This may be a result of the internal
structure of Congress, which suffers from, at times crippling,
collective action problems. The passage of legislation through
both Houses with many members is fraught with such difficulty
that the Constitution can be understood to favor inaction and,
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therefore, maintenance of the status quo. The status quo may be
best for a nation when it enjoys peace and prosperity, where
threats come more often from ill-advised efforts at reform or
revolutionary change. But maintaining the status quo may harm
the nation when long-term threats are approaching, or
unanticipated opportunities present themselves and must be
seized rapidly before vanishing.
In the area of domestic affairs, whether the New Deal or
internal security programs, Roosevelt worked hand-in-hand with
Congress. He had to: the Great Depression’s economic nature
brought it squarely within the enumerated powers of Congress.
Nevertheless, the emergency of the Depression illuminated the
natural advantages of presidential leadership in the legislative
process. A complex economy beset by a mysterious, but
dangerous, ailment required administrative expertise for a cure,
and Congress willingly cooperated by transferring massive
legislative authority to the agencies.
FDR deserves praised for trying every reasonable idea,
including this transformation of executive-legislative relations, to
reverse the sickening drop in economic activity. Crucially,
neither he, nor anyone else, affirmatively knew how to end the
Depression. Only now do we know that the New Deal, combined
with the Federal Reserve’s tight monetary policy and the
government’s restrictive fiscal policies, prolonged the Great
Depression itself. Rather, it was World War II, not the New Deal,
which ended the persistent unemployment levels of the 1930s.
When the smoke cleared in 1945, the New Deal’s true legacy
endured in the form of bloated, independent bureaucracies that
future presidents would struggle to control. Plainly, presidential
cooperation with Congress provides no guarantee of success, and,
in fact, can prove quite malignant.
Throughout FDR’s astounding presidency, a theme unites
both his success in foreign policy and the appearance of such in
domestic policy. FDR believed deeply in the independence of the
presidency and a vigorous use of its constitutional authorities. He
did not shrink from constitutional confrontations with the other
branches. To pursue the policies he believed to be in the national
interest such confrontation was often required. He openly
disagreed with the Supreme Court’s limitations on the New Deal
and publicly sought to manipulate its membership. He pushed
his powers as Commander-in-Chief beyond their perceived limits,
refusing to abide by the spirit, and sometimes the letter, of the
Neutrality Acts in order to involve the United States in a war
that neither Congress nor a clear majority of Americans favored.
FDR correctly judged the threat to the nation’s existence posed
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by the rise of fascism. The nation and the world are better off
today because he pushed a reluctant nation into war. His broad
understanding of his executive powers created the foundation for
policies that secured freedom in the twentieth century.

Do Not Delete

272

3/5/18 1:46 PM

Chapman Law Review

[Vol. 21:1

